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[415] 
DITCHING OUR INNOCENCE: THE CLEAN WATER ACT IN 
THE AGE OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 
BY 
RACHAEL SALCIDO * & KARRIGAN BÖRK** 
Humanity has entered the Age of the Anthropocene, a geologic era 
marked by the emergence of human activity as the single most 
dominant influence on Earth’s environment. Every ecosystem shows 
signs of anthropogenic influence, and the environments we experience 
everyday are often shaped almost entirely by human actions and 
decisions. The new discipline of reconciliation ecology recognizes this 
reality and suggests that we must manage the new habitats we create in 
order to protect species diversity and ecosystem services. But the 2015 
rule defining the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act explicitly excludes 
many manmade environments, including many artificial lakes, farm 
ponds, reflecting pools, and most ditches, treating these landscape 
features as faux nature somehow unworthy of protection. This 
treatment is a marked departure from past Environmental Protection 
Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers practices, which allowed for 
consideration of such places on a case-by-case basis. This departure 
finds no support in the Supreme Court precedent leading up to the new 
rule and seems to be based entirely on a shortsighted view of these 
places as somehow unimportant to protecting the waters of the United 
States. Based on the law and science surrounding ditches, we conclude 
that such places merit protection under the Clean Water Act. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the University of California, Davis, the UC Davis Arboretum 
stretches along the campus’s southern border. The Arboretum covers more 
than one hundred acres and hosts the largest assemblage of California native 
plants in the California interior.1 The Arboretum houses more than thirty 
species of mammals, seven fish species, three amphibian species, nineteen 
kinds of reptiles, and more than 135 species of birds have been observed 
nesting or roosting in the Arboretum.2 At a campus focused on the 
environment, the Arboretum serves as a constant reminder of the stakes in 
our environmental debates. And the living heart of the Arboretum is a long, 
narrow waterway, which broadens in several locations into picturesque 
reflecting pools. The Arboretum Waterway and associated ponds cover ten 
acres and hold roughly 1.8 million cubic feet of water at full capacity.3 A path 
runs the roughly one and one third mile length of the Arboretum Waterway, 
through the length the Arboretum, crossing and recrossing the stream. In the 
summer, when temperatures soar over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit and 
the campus hasn’t seen a raindrop in months, this stretch of water feels like 
the only thing keeping the Arboretum from burning up. The Arboretum 
Waterway gives the Arboretum the feeling of an oasis in California’s 
seasonal desert. 
	
 1  Univ. of Cal. Davis Arboretum, About Us, http://arboretum.ucdavis.edu/about_us.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Barbara Anderson, In Our Own Backyard: A History of the UC Davis 
Arboretum, UC DAVIS MAGAZINE, Spring 1997, http://ucdavismagazine.ucdavis.edu/issues/ 
sp97/Feature/Feature_Arbo_1.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).  
 2  Univ. of Cal. Davis Arboretum, Wildlife in the Arboretum, http://arboretum.ucdavis.edu/ 
wildlife.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).  
 3  UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF RES. MGMT. AND PLANNING, ARBORETUM WATERWAY 
IMPROVEMENTS PROJECT 11 (May 2006) [hereinafter WATERWAY IMPROVEMENTS PROJECT]; UNIV. 
OF CAL. DAVIS, 2003 LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 4.8-
10 (2003) [hereinafter LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FIER], available at http://sustainability. 
ucdavis.edu/local_resources/docs/environreview/lrdpeir/4.08_hydrowtrqual.pdf. 
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The problem with this image, of course, is that this isn’t real nature. It’s 
all just a human construction. The waterway running through the Arboretum 
is a ditch, or maybe a drainage pond, running along what was once roughly 
the course of the North Fork of Putah Creek, the Creek’s historic main stem. 
The city of Davis, California,4 experienced regular flooding from the North 
Fork of Putah Creek until the 1890s, when the stream was rerouted to a 
manmade streambed running south of the city.5 Rerouting the stream left an 
empty streambed through the city. The Corps of Engineers finished the 
rerouting in the 1940s, with the addition of permanent levees along the new 
southern route for the creek and the historic North Fork.6 Volunteers created 
the “creek” running through the Arboretum in 1969, along the empty channel 
of the North Fork of Putah Creek.7 The water in the Arboretum Waterway 
comes from the campus’s central drainage system, which collects storm 
water runoff and sends it, via large pipes, into the Arboretum Waterway.8 
During major rain events, the storm water may flow via pipe into a pump 
pond and then into an underground storm drain; aside from these events, the 
creek has no flow.9 So this isn’t a real creek, or real nature. It’s just 
something we made to look pretty on campus. Faux nature,10 if you will. 
But here’s the rub: for the 250,000 people who visit the Arboretum 
Waterway every year,11 for the more than 100 UC Davis classes that use the 
arboretum,12 and for the thousands of school children who visit annually, this 
place, with its manmade creek, may be the closest they come to nature.13 
And certainly, to the fish, wildlife, and plants that call the Arboretum home, 
the waterway’s unnatural origin doesn’t matter at all. 
More broadly, most of our natural places have some degree of human 
impact—every ecosystem we have studied shows pervasive human 
impacts.14 A few examples: nearly all of the larger rivers in the northern third 
	
 4  Davis began its life as Davisville in the 1860s. City of Davis, Cal., History & Symbols, 
http://cityofdavis.org/about-davis/history-symbols (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 5  LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FIER, supra note 3, at 4.8-1 to 4.8-2. 
 6  Id. at 4.8-2. 
 7  CITY OF DAVIS, NISHI GATEWAY PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 4.9-1 
(2015), available at http://documents.cityofdavis.org/Media/Default/Documents/PDF/CDD/ 
ED/projects/Innovation-Centers/Nishi/Draft-EIR/4.09-Hydrology-and-Water-Quality.pdf. 
 8  WATERWAY IMPROVEMENTS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 56. 
 9  MOORE IACOFANO GOLTSMAN, INC., UC DAVIS LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 18 (2003), 
available at http://sustainability.ucdavis.edu/progress/commitment/planning/lrdp.html. 
 10  “Faux nature” is “a landscape created or restored by humans to mimic as nearly as 
possible the natural environment that may have existed there or somewhere else at a prior 
time.” Rachael E. Salcido, The Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge: On a Rocky 
Road to Creating a Community Asset, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1401, 1413–14 (2014). 
 11  Anderson, supra note 1. 
 12  Univ. of Cal. Davis Arboretum, UC Davis Courses and Faculty Use of Arboretum, 
http://arboretum.ucdavis.edu/classes.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 13  See Oliver R.W. Pergams & Patricia A. Zaradic, Is Love of Nature in the US Becoming 
Love of Electronic Media? 16-Year Downtrend in National Park Visits Explained by Watching 
Movies, Playing Video Games, Internet Use, and Oil Prices, 80 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 387, 388 (2006) 
(documenting a significant downturn in per capita national park visitation since 1988, 
suggesting a wider trend of societal disconnect with nature).  
 14  Josh Dunlan et al., Re-Wilding North America, 436 NATURE 913, 913 (2005). 
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of the world are now regulated by dams, which control most or all of their 
flow;15 as early as the 1950s, the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) estimated that 189,000 miles of open ditches had been constructed 
to drain agricultural lands;16 and estimates for loss of riparian habitats in the 
United States range as high as 70%, due in large part to channelization.17 We 
are entering the Age of the Anthropocene, a period in which human activity 
has become the dominant influence on climate and the environment. We are 
“curating” our environments and have the capacity to contribute to resilient, 
intact systems or ensure the demise of all ecosystem services. Increasingly, 
the old separatist view that considers humans as something quite apart from 
nature is falling away,18 as ecologists recognize that we must determine what 
our natural environment will look like.19 Our efforts to preserve pristine 
environments are falling short; there simply aren’t enough pristine places 
left, and our ecological footprint, through global crises like climate change, 
encompasses the whole earth. Most of our interactions with the natural 
world now occur in environments that we have either created out of whole 
cloth or deeply influenced, and our efforts at environmental protection must 
recognize the central role of manmade environments in our future. Many of 
our environmental statutes and regulations are based on the outmoded view 
of humans as something outside of nature,20 and the new Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) regulations 
defining the waters of the United States for jurisdictional purposes under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act)21 are no exception.22 Although evident in 
the agencies’ decision to exclude manmade structures like farm ponds and 
reflecting pools, this paradigm is perhaps clearest in the regulation’s 
treatment of the lowly ditch. Ditches, and the agricultural processes they 
	
 15  Mats Dynesius & Christer Nilsson, Fragmentation and Flow Regulation of River Systems 
in the Northern Third of the World, 266 SCI. 753 (1994). 
 16  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM DRAINAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, STATUS AND 
PROSPECTS 5 (1979), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED295043.pdf.  
 17  Id. at 128.  
 18  See, e.g., Timothy H. Profeta, Managing Without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in 
Light of Ecological Advances, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 71, 74 (1996) (discussing how 
“society’s perspective on environmental regulation must change . . . [to recognize] humans as 
part of, rather than separate from nature”). 
 19  MICHAEL L. ROSENZWIEG, WIN-WIN ECOLOGY: HOW THE EARTH’S SPECIES CAN SURVIVE IN THE 
MIDST OF HUMAN ENTERPRISE 7 (2003). 
 20  See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 1, 12–13 (1996) (discussing the new paradigms of ecology and their connection to 
environmental law at the first annual Cummings Colloquium on Environmental Law).  
 21  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 22  As discussed elsewhere in this symposium issue, through a series of cases the U.S. 
Supreme Court has addressed the extent of the reach of the federal CWA. Most recently, in 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), the Justices were split over extent of jurisdiction 
for overland flows and invalidated a previous regulatory interpretation. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, responsible for implementation of 
the CWA, adopted a new rule, the Clean Water Rule, defining “waters of the United States.” 
Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 
2015) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule] (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 
116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
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facilitate, have important impacts on the natural environment that may 
require regulatory attention, and ditches may serve in and of themselves as 
important “natural” habitats for species of conservation concern. 
 The proposed Clean Water Rule attempted to clarify the agencies’ 
practice related to regulation of ditches, and agricultural activities more 
broadly.23 However, the proposed rule’s treatment of ditches became one of 
the most controversial pieces of the proposed rule, and the agencies revised 
the final rule to largely exclused ephemeral and intermittent ditches that 
flow only when it rains, and it include the narrow class of ditches that are 
also tributaries.24 
The controversy over ditches illustrates a confluence of factors. Ditches 
refer to a manmade hole used to move or hold water,25 and some agitated for 
the CWA rule to exclude all manmade features from jurisdiction.26 A public 
campaign designed to ridicule the scope of jurisdiction over ditches and 
other mandmade features proposed for coverage by the new rule27 illustrates 
a general strategy of obscuring the actual scope of interconnectedness of 
certain manmade features, focusing instead on their unnatural origin, as if 
that origin precluded their having an important role in the ecosystem.  
Our thesis is that this view—a view that considers our manmade 
habitats as not worthy of protection—fails to recognize our role in habitat 
creation and modification, and simply does not make sense in the Age of the 
Anthropocene. Treating manmade features as second-class environmental 
habitats under this rule excludes waters that would otherwise contribute to 
	
 23  Compare Definition of “Waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 22,188, 22,272–73 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (excluding ditches that are “excavated wholly in 
uplands, drain only uplands, and have less than perennial flow”), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(3)(i)–
(ii) (excluding ditches “with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary or excavated in a 
tributary,” and ditches “with intermittent flow that are not a relocated tributary, excavated in a 
tributary, or drain wetlands”). 
 24  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(3)(i)–(ii) (2015). As a practical matter, 
identifying which ditches are excavated in or relocate a tributary will be a difficult, fact-driven 
determination. The extent of channelization and manipulation of natural features is extensive 
and the historical antecedents may not be well documented. Moreover, the agency will need to 
conduct case-specific determinations for what particular stretches of a ditch are jurisdictional 
and which upstream and downstream portions of the stretches are non jurisdictional. 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 37,098 (noting that this approach “balances the exclusion with the need to ensure that 
covered tributaries, and the significant functions they provide, are preserved”)  
 25  Merriam-Webster, Ditch, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ditch (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016) (defining the term “ditch” as “a long narrow hole that is dug along a road, field, 
etc., and used to hold or move water”). The term “ditch” is not defined in the final rule; the 
agencies declined to define it, reasoning that doing so would cause more confusion. CLAUDIA 
COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43455, EPA AND THE ARMY CORPS’ RULE TO DEFINE “WATERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES” 10 (2016). 
 26  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,079 (noting that “[s]everal commenters suggested that the rule exclude 
all constructed waters from the definition of ‘waters of the United States’”). The agencies then 
note that some constructed waters are excluded from jurisdiction, but constructed tributaries 
are jurisdictional “unless expressly excluded in paragraph (b) . . . .” Id. The Rule also exempts 
many other manmade water features in section. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(4). 
 27  See Am. Farm Bureau, It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, http://ditchtherule.fb.org/custom_ 
page/its-time-to-ditch-the-rule/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (summarizing the campaign). 
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the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of the waters of the United 
States.28 
In this Article, Part II briefly covers the statutory, regulatory, and case 
law background leading up to the new Clean Water Rule, with particular 
attention to the Supreme Court’s discussion of ditches. Part III provides 
specific analysis of the regulation of ditches as agricultural features under 
the CWA. Part IV discusses the scientific rationale for protecting ditches, 
and Part V expands on the argument that regulators are facing resistance to 
employing legal tools to manage actions affecting manmade features and 
explains why these features must be protected to effectively address 
environmental degradation in the United States. Part VI concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND ON WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Congress passed the CWA in its current form in 1972 to help maintain 
and improve the quality of the nation’s waters.29 The Act seeks “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”30 To accomplish this objective, the CWA bans the unpermitted 
discharge of any pollutant by any person.31 The “discharge of a pollutant” in 
part means “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source”;32 pollutants include not just the classic pollutants like chemical 
wastes and sewage, but also dredged spoil and rock, sand, dirt, and other fill 
materials.33 EPA holds primary authority to implement the CWA and has 
authority to permit discharges that would otherwise violate the Act for most 
pollutants.34 The Corps, however, has primary authority to permit discharge 
of dredge and fill materialsthat is, the filling in of wetlands and other 
watersunder section 404.35 These permits are required for any discharge of 
dredged or fill material into “navigable waters.”36 The legal term “navigable 
waters” has different meanings depending on the context, such as for state 
	
 28  Indeed, the agencies emphasize that natural or constructed tributaries have the same 
general effect downstream. “Given the extensive human modification of watercourses and 
hydrologic systems throughout the country, it is often difficult to distinguish between natural 
watercourses and watercourses that are wholly or partly modified or constructed.” 80 Fed. Reg. 
at 37,078. 
 29  Prior versions of water pollution control statute addressed the issue of water quality but 
not until 1972 did the federal government play a significant role in implementing controls. 
Earlier versions were known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the popular name 
“Clean Water Act” comes from the amendments in 1977. ROBIN CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN 
CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS 712 (3d ed. 2012). 
 30  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 31  Id. § 1311(a).  
 32  Id. § 1362(12). 
 33  Id. § 1362(6). 
 34  See id. § 1311(a) (prohibiting discharges of pollutants without a permit); id. § 1342 
(granting EPA authority to issue permits for the discharge of any pollutant). 
 35  Id. § 1344(a) (granting the Secretary of the Army authority to issue permits for 
discharges of “dredged or fill material into the navigable waters”). 
 36  Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a). 
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title to riverbeds or for commerce.37 In the CWA, Congress defined the term 
“navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”38 EPA and the Corps understood that Congress intended this 
ambiguity to broaden jurisdiction beyond just those waters that were 
navigable-in-fact,39 but the exact scope of jurisdiction based on this 
definition was unclear. The agencies have defined this jurisdiction through 
rulemaking several times since the passage of the Act, and in turn their 
efforts to define their jurisdiction have been challenged in the Supreme 
Court three times, with varied results.40 The agencies’ most recent effort, the 
Clean Water Rule, builds on those three cases. 
A. Supreme Court Decisions Leading to the Clean Water Rule 
In 1975, the Corps promulgated a rule that defined CWA jurisdiction so 
as to include tributaries of navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters or their tributaries.41 In 1985, in United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview), a unanimous Court deferred to 
the Corps’ judgment that adjacent wetlands were waters of the United States 
and thus jurisdictional.42 The court said that the term “navigable” was of 
“limited import,”43 focusing instead on the broad ambitions of the CWA, “a 
comprehensive legislative attempt ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”44 The Court noted 
that “Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed 
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes,” and relied 
on “the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water 
quality and aquatic ecosystems” to find that it was “reasonable for the Corps 
to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as 
more conventionally defined.”45 
The Corps published new regulations in 1986, which broadened the 
definition of waters of the United States to include any waters, including 
isolated, intrastate waters that affected interstate commerce.46 This explicitly 
included those waters that “are or would be used as habitat” by migratory 
	
 37  Robin Craig, Navigability and Its Consequences: State Title, Mineral Rights, and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, in 60 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND. ANN. INST. 7-1 (2015). As Professor 
Craig explains, federal law definitions of the term “navigable water” “serve to delineate various 
kinds of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 7-2. 
 38  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 39  See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132–33 (1985) 
(discussing Congress’s decision to “define the waters covered by the Act broadly”). 
 40  Id.; Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 41  Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123. 
 42  Id. at 139. 
 43  Id. at 133. 
 44  Id. at 132 (quoting CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012)). 
 45  Id. at 133. 
 46  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 329). 
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birds (either crossing state lines or protected by treaty).47 This change 
expanded its interpretation of jurisdiction to not only adjacent wetlands, but 
to isolated ponds and wetlands, with no obvious connection to more 
conventionally defined waters of the United States.48 This regulation became 
known as the Migratory Bird Rule.49 In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),50 the 
Court rejected isolated nonnavigable intrastate ponds as waters of the 
United States.51 The Corps had judged various ponds located at an 
abandoned gravel mining operation jurisdictional, and petitioners argued 
both that these waters were beyond the limits of federal reach under the 
Commerce Clause, and more narrowly that the Migratory Bird Rule went 
beyond the waters of the United States as envisioned by Congress when it 
passed the Act.52 The Court did not rule on the constitutional issue, instead 
treating the case as a somewhat more traditional statutory interpretation 
question.53 Nevertheless, in a five–to–four decision, the Court deemed the 
Migratory Bird Rule unlawful and rejected respondents’ urging to consider 
the Migratory Bird Rule an extension of the Riverside Bayview decision.54 
The Court relied in no small part on the words “navigable waters” from the 
statute, noting that upholding the Corps decision would mean “isolated 
ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois counties, fall 
under the section 404(a) definition of ‘navigable waters’ because they serve 
as habitat for migratory birds.”55 Though the Court emphasized that 
Congress’s choice of the term “navigable” must be given some import, it was 
again unclear how broadly the agencies might validly interpret the statutory 
definition “waters of the United States.” Still, the Court highlighted the 
breadth of Congress’s goals in passing the CWA, and recognized that such 
ambitious goals would require broad jurisdiction for the agencies: 
“Congress’[s] concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic 
ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands ‘inseparably bound up 
with the waters of the United States.’ It was the significant nexus between 
the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA 
in [Riverside Bayview].”56 This close decision offered limited guidance for 
	
 47  Id. at 41,217. 
 48  Id. 
 49  See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering 
the validity of the “migratory bird rule”).  
 50  531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 51  Id. at 168. 
 52  Id. at 164–66. 
 53  Not entirely traditional, however. In light of the potential Commerce Clause implications, 
the Court “read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism 
questions raised by respondents’ interpretation, and therefore reject the request for 
administrative deference.” Id. at 174. 
 54  Id. at 171–72 
 55  Id. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC: Federalism and the Politics of 
Locally Unwanted Land Uses, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 283, 306 (Richard J. Lazarus & 
Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) (discussing the Court’s avoidance of potential constitutional issues 
without identifying the specific constitutional question raised by the set of facts in the case). 
 56  SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001). 
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the agencies. The agencies sought to rewrite their definition of “waters of 
the United States,” publishing an “Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of ‘Waters of the United 
States’” in 2003,57 but the proposed rulemaking never got off the ground,58 
and the agencies made do with what was left of their pre-SWANCC 
regulations. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this approach led the Corps directly back to the 
Supreme Court. In 2006, in Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos), a fractured 
Court struggled to reach agreement or clarity concerning the coverage of the 
CWA. In this, the most recent Supreme Court case to interpret the term 
“waters of the United States,” the Court considered “four Michigan wetlands, 
which lie near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into 
traditional navigable waters.”59 The Justices all agreed that the CWA 
jurisdiction includes more than just waters that are navigable in the 
traditional sense.60 But they largely diverged at this point—the rest of the 
opinion stands as a terrible example of judicial balkanization, with five 
separate opinions addressing the issues. 
A plurality, announcing the judgment of the Court and written by 
Justice Scalia on behalf of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and 
Justice Alito, determined that jurisdictional waters must be either traditional 
navigable waters, waters connected to traditional navigable waters by 
permanent flows (not ephemeral or intermittent flows), or wetlands 
adjacent to either of those water bodies.61 The plurality specifically rejected 
wetlands adjacent to waters that flowed only intermittently.62 The opinion 
came to this conclusion by first noting that the CWA defined “navigable 
waters” as “the waters of the United States,” and then suggesting that, “[i]n 
this form, ‘the waters’ refers more narrowly to water ‘[a]s found in streams 
and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] 
lakes.’”63 The opinion concluded, without explanation, that “[o]n this 
definition, ‘the waters of the United States’ include only relatively 
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.”64 The plurality drew further 
support for this view of “the waters” from “the commonsense understanding 
of the term,”65 the Act’s use of the term “navigable waters,”66 and, “[m]ost 
significant of all, [the idea that] the CWA itself categorizes the channels and 
conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from 
	
 57  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition 
of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003). 
 58  See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757–58 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(explaining that the “proposed rulemaking went nowhere”) 
 59  Id. at 729 (plurality opinion). 
 60  Id. at 730; id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61  Id. at 739 (plurality opinion). 
 62  Id. at 733–36. 
 63  Id. at 732 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). 
 64  Id. at 733–34. 
 65  Id. at 734. 
 66  Id. 
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‘navigable waters,’ by including them in the definition of ‘point source.’”67 
Based on this categorization of conveyances that typically carry intermittent 
flows of water as point sources, the plurality concluded that intermittent 
flows were not likely to be conceived of as navigable waters because that 
would create overlapping potential inclusion of such features as waters of 
the United States.68 
After determining that the waters had to be relatively permanent water 
bodies, the plurality held that tributaries to traditional navigable waters 
could only be considered waters of the United States if they were “a 
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate 
navigable waters.”69 The plurality then concluded that jurisdictional wetlands 
include “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies 
that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there is no 
clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands . . . .”70 This approach led 
the plurality to limit jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to tributaries with a 
relatively permanent flow.71 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, that would have deferred to agency expertise as per 
the Chevron doctrine.72 Of note here, the dissent attacked the plurality’s 
“point source” argument, rejecting the plurality’s assumption that the 
conveyances listed as point sources do in fact generally carry water only 
intermittently.73 With the clarification that these sources are often 
continuous, the dissent suggests, “the definition of ‘point source’ in 33 
U. S. C. § 1362(14) . . . has no conceivable bearing on whether permanent 
tributaries should be treated differently from intermittent ones.”74 The 
dissent also rejected the plurality’s dictionary-based argument, noting that 
the term “streams” in no way requires the features to have permanent 
water.75 Under this broader reading, intermittent streams would be among 
the waters of the United States. This would certainly include the ephemeral 
streams, dry arroyos, slot canyons, and many other geographical features 
that are created by water but only experience flows on a periodic basis.76 As 
the dissent notes, the U.S. Geological Survey has symbols for such 
geographical features, including intermittent streams and seasonal rivers.77 
As a third strike, the dissent attacked the plurality’s common sense 
	
 67  Id. at 735. 
 68  Id. at 735–36 (noting that because ditches, conduits, and other features were defined as 
point sources, it lent support to the view that intermittently flowing features were “by and large, 
not ‘waters of the United States’” (emphasis in original)).  
 69  Id. at 742. 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. at 732. 
 72  Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73  Id. at 802. 
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. at 801. 
 76  See id. (arguing that “common sense and common usage demonstrate that intermittent 
streams, like perennial streams, are still streams”). 
 77  Id. 
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argument, suggesting instead that adoption of the plurality view would result 
in a reading of the Act that let the Corps “regulate polluters who dump 
dredge into a stream that flows year round but [not] polluters who dump 
into a neighboring stream that flows for only 290 days of the year,” without 
regard to the effects of the dumping on downstream traditionally navigable 
waters.78 In short, in light of the Act’s broad purpose and language, the 
dissent would have deferred to the Corps’ expertise in determining the 
waters covered by the Act. 
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the dissent explains the take-
home message from this divided court. Because “all four Justices who have 
joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in . . . all other cases 
in which either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on 
remand each of the judgments should be reinstated if either of those tests is 
met.”79 
Indeed, the plurality opinion became the judgment of the Court only 
because Justice Kennedy wrote separately to concur in the outcome. More 
importantly, his concurrence set out an entirely different (and generally 
broader) test for jurisdiction. Before reaching his own test, however, Justice 
Kennedy explicitly and forcefully rejected the plurality’s conclusion that the 
waters had to be relatively permanent water bodies.80 On this point, he 
joined the dissent, holding that “the dissent is correct to observe that an 
intermittent flow can constitute a stream, in the sense of ‘[a] current or 
course of water or other fluid, flowing on the earth,’ while it is flowing. It 
follows that the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of 
such impermanent streams.”81 Justice Kennedy also addressed the plurality’s 
textual argument concerning point sources and navigable waters, arguing 
that “[n]othing in the point-source definition requires an intermittent flow,” 
and that “certain water bodies could conceivably constitute both a point 
source and a water.”82 
After rejecting the plurality’s view, Justice Kennedy’s opinion laid out 
his alternative definition. He emphasized that the key factor to determine 
CWA jurisdiction was whether a water has a “significant nexus” to 
traditional navigable waters, such that “the wetlands, either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more 
readily understood as ‘navigable.’”83 He drew this language in large part from 
the Court’s earlier opinion in Riverside Bayview,84 language that was also 
	
 78  Id. at 800. 
 79  Id. at 810. 
 80  Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81  Id. at 770 (internal citation omitted). 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 779–80. 
 84  Id. at 779 (“[T]he Court indicated that ‘the term “navigable” as used in the Act is of 
limited import,’ [relying], in upholding jurisdiction, on the Corps’ judgment that ‘wetlands 
adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral parts of 
the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source 
in the adjacent bodies of water[.]’” (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 133–35 (1985))). 
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echoed in the SWANCC decision.85 He reiterated that the status of wetlands 
as “integral parts of the aquatic environment” was the rationale for 
jurisdiction over them as waters of the United States in Riverside Bayview,86 
and that the lack of a significant nexus between the abandoned mines-cum-
wetlands and any traditional navigable water in SWANCC kept those waters 
out of the Act’s reach.87 In short, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence brings under 
CWA jurisdiction any waters—even waters with only ephemeral or 
intermittent flows88—if they are “likely to play an important role in the 
integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters as traditionally 
understood.”89 
B. Post-Rapanos Confusion 
Exactly what constituted waters of the United States for purposes of 
CWA jurisdiction was an open question post-Rapanos. The agencies 
developed post-Rapanos guidance and initiated work for a new rulemaking.90 
In the interim, circuit courts split after Rapanos and took different 
approaches to the question of jurisdiction. Some courts adopted the 
significant nexus test as the exclusive test, while others found that 
jurisdiction could be met if either the plurality written by Justice Scalia or 
the significant nexus test was met. 
The Supreme Court previously addressed the approach to determining a 
holding from a fractured decision in Marks v. United States.91 Marks held 
that the position to apply from a fractured decision is the position of the 
Justices who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.92 For 
purposes of Rapanos, this means the least restrictive test for finding 
jurisdiction under the CWA. A straightforward reading of Marks would not 
include consideration of the views of dissenting justices. 
In United States v. Johnson,93 the First Circuit determined that the 
Supreme Court had backed away somewhat from the Marks test and had 
considered the opinions of dissenting Justices in determining the holding of 
a previously fragmented court.94 From that reasoning, the Johnson court said 
	
 85  See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“The term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of 
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional 
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be 
made so.”). 
 86  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 87  Id. at 766–67. 
 88  Id. at 771–72. 
 89  Id. at 781. 
 90  See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR 
THE CLEAN WATER RULE: DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES (2015), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/technical_support_document_for 
_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf (addressing the legal basis and existing scientific literature in 
support of the significant nexus determinations underpinning the Clean Water Rule). 
 91  430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 92  Id. at 193.  
 93  467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 94  Id. at 64. 
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jurisdiction would be appropriate if either test—that of the plurality or 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus—were met.95 
This approach was in fact recommended by the dissenting Justices in 
Rapanos. The dissenting opinion noted that the four Justices joining in the 
dissent would find jurisdiction appropriate under either the plurality or 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test.96 Cognizant that lower courts would 
find it difficult to parse the holding, Justice Stevens suggested that on 
remand the lower court should find jurisdiction appropriate if either of those 
tests were met, stating: 
I would affirm the judgments . . . and respectfully dissent from the decision of 
five Members of this Court to vacate and remand. I close, however, by noting 
an unusual feature of the Court’s judgments in these cases. It has been our 
practice in a case coming to us from a lower federal court to enter a judgment 
commanding that court to conduct any further proceedings pursuant to a 
specific mandate. That prior practice has, on occasion, made it necessary for 
Justices to join a judgment that did not conform to their own views. In these 
cases, however, while both the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that there 
must be a remand for further proceedings, their respective opinions define 
different tests to be applied on remand. Given that all four Justices who have 
joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in both of these 
cases—and in all other cases in which either the plurality’s or Justice 
Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand each of the judgments should be 
reinstated if either of those tests is met.97 
However, in United States v. Robison,98 the Eleventh Circuit felt 
compelled by the language of Marks to look only at the plurality and 
concurrence.99 It rejected the option of taking the “pragmatic” approach in 
Johnson, and ultimately found that Kennedy’s significant nexus test was the 
narrowest grounds and thus controlling on the question of jurisdiction.100 The 
Ninth Circuit also held that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controlled and 
thus adopted the significant nexus test for jurisdiction.101 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gerke Excavating, 
Inc.102—following the principle that the controlling law should be “the 
narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if 
forced to choose”—found that Justice Kennedy’s test would be the 
narrowest in most situations, but not in all.103 Indeed, a good example is 
Robison, where the facts indicated that a very small volume of continuous 
	
 95  Id.  
 96  Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97  Id. The dissent also noted that it was most likely that Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” test would “be controlling in most cases.” Id. at 810 n.14. 
 98  505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 99  Id. at 1221.  
 100  Id. at 1220–21.  
 101  N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 102  464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 103  Id. at 724–25. 
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surface flow connected a creek to a downstream navigable water.104 That 
continuous surface connection may well have made the waters in question 
jurisdictional under the plurality’s test, although no attempt to quantify a 
significant nexus between the creek and downstream navigable waters had 
been attempted, and meeting the significant nexus standard on the facts was 
questionable.105 
In short, the specificity of the tests adopted by the plurality and Justice 
Kennedy in Rapanos make the Marks test particularly unhelpful.106 Line 
drawing, for purposes of the CWA, is quite messy, not only because we are 
dealing with an objective as complex as preservation and improvement of 
water quality and statutory language susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
but also because of the balancing of stakeholder critiques that the Supreme 
Court succumbed to.107 Now the agencies have also followed suit. 
The agencies’ rationale for the present rulemaking relies entirely on 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, directly echoing his language.108 The 
agencies note: “Peer-reviewed science and practical experience demonstrate 
that upstream waters, including headwaters and wetlands, significantly 
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters 
by playing a crucial role in controlling . . . vital chemical, physical, and 
biological processes.”109 The agencies strategically couch the significant 
nexus idea within the broader framework of the CWA, harkening back to the 
Supreme Court’s broad reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview, in light of 
its objectives.110 The agencies assess the significance of the nexus in terms of 
the CWA’s objective to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
	
 104  Robison, 505 F.3d at 1211–12. 
 105  Id. at 1212 (referring to a tracer test, which is used to determine whether there is a 
significant nexus to a navigable body of water). 
 106  To see the continued contest regarding the controlling test for jurisdiction in the 
litigation over the Clean Water Rule, the complaint filed by the States of Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi against the Clean Water Rule in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas also charges that the agencies have adopted the incorrect standards, using both the 
argument that the rule does not comport with the plurality’s standard and the argument that the 
rule does not comport with the significant nexus test. Complaint and Petition for Review at 22–
23, Texas v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-cv-162 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2015) (arguing that 
reliance on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is misplaced). The complaint reaches the issue of 
ditches specifically, expressing concern that agencies could assert jurisdiction over “dry ponds, 
ephemeral steams, intermittent channels, and even ditches” consistent with the definition of 
tributary. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  
 107  In Rapanos, even Justice Kennedy noted that the plurality’s tone was unduly dismissive 
of the interests promoted by the Government in the case. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 786 (2006). 
 108  The agencies also follow along with Justice Kennedy’s recasting of Riverside Bayview 
and SWANCC in terms of the nexus approach: “This significant nexus standard was first 
informed by the ecological and hydrological connections the Supreme Court noted in Riverside 
Bayview, developed and established by the Supreme Court in SWANCC, and further refined in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos.” Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,056 (June 29, 
2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 
401). 
 109  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055. 
 110  Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). 
11_TO JCI.SALCIDO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016  1:04 PM 
2016] DITCHING OUR INNOCENCE 429 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”111 In short, the nexus between 
headwaters, wetlands, or tributaries and traditional navigable waters is 
significant when the downstream effects of those waters are not merely 
speculative or insubstantial. 
By relying on the significant nexus approach, and particularly by 
focusing on the degree to which upstream waters significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters, the 
agencies are able to reduce much of this freighted jurisdictional question 
down to a cleaner inquiry as to the degree to which one water body (defined 
very broadly) influences another. This is the kind of question science is well 
equipped to answer, and EPA’s Office of Research and Development 
prepared a comprehensive report addressing just this question.112 
C. Scientific Study Underpinning Rulemaking 
EPA released the draft scientific study discussing the interrelated 
nature of water and its multiple contributory sources in January 2013.113 The 
final report, entitled “Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream 
Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence” was published 
on January 15, 2015.114 EPA noted that the report was created to support the 
agencies’ rulemaking for defining waters of the United States for CWA 
purposes,115 and it “summarize[s] current scientific understanding about the 
connectivity and mechanisms by which streams and wetlands, singly or in 
aggregate, affect the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of 
downstream waters.”116 
The full report stretches an exhaustive 408 pages, but focusing on the 
report’s examination of ditches filters the information down to a manageable 
level. The report suggests that ditches have two primary effects: 1) they can 
increase hydrological and biological connectivity;117 and 2) they change the 
way water moves through a watershed.118 
	
 111  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 112  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM 
WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2015) [hereinafter CONNECTIVITY 
FINAL REPORT], available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=296414& 
CFID=47143649&CFTOKEN=93241855. 
 113  The draft scientific study was provided to the Scientific Advisory Board in September 
2013. Notification of a Public Meeting of the Science Advisory Board Panel for the Review of the 
EPA Water Body Connectivity Report, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,536, 58,536 (Sept. 24, 2013). 
 114  Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis 
of the Scientific Evidence, 80 Fed. Reg. 2100 (Jan. 15, 2015); CONNECTIVITY FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 113.  
 115  80 Fed. Reg. at 2100. 
 116  CONNECTIVITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 1-1. 
 117  Id. at 1-11. 
 118  Id. at 5-7, 6-6. 
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1. Ditches Can Increase Hydrological and Biological Connectivity 
Connectivity is “defined in this report as the degree to which 
components of a watershed are joined and interact by transport mechanisms 
that function across multiple spatial and temporal scales.”119 The report 
found that ditches increased hydrological connectivity within watersheds by 
creating more frequent temporary connections between surface waters, 
including connection from bays to downstream systems,120 potholes to 
stream networks,121 and non-floodplain wetlands to the river network.122 
These new hydrological connections “have impaired wetland habitat and 
functions; increased downstream export of excess nutrients and other 
contaminants; and decreased recharge of local and regional aquifers”;123 and 
“increase[d] the frequencies of occurrence and transport rates of nutrients, 
carbon, and metals to downstream surface waters.”124 The increased 
hydrological connectivity from ditches also increases biological 
connectivity, allowing fish and other aquatic creatures to disperse through 
the human-created surface water connections.125 
2. Ditches Change the Way Water Moves Through a Watershed 
Ditches change the rate and path of runoff,126 interrupting overland flow 
(the sheeting flow that moves across the surface of the land) and shifting it 
into ditches, where waters move downstream more quickly.127 The report 
noted that ditches “could increase stormflow and contribute to downstream 
flooding. . . . [T]otal streamflow and baseflow are increased by directly 
connecting potholes to stream networks. The impacts of changing 
streamflow are numerous, including altered flow regime, stream 
geomorphology, habitat, and ecology.”128 In urban areas, the “[d]ense 
networks of ditches and culverts in cities reduce the distance that runoff 
must travel overland or through subsurface flow paths to reach streams and 
rivers. Once water enters a drainage network, it flows faster than either 
overland or subsurface flow.”129 In areas with more rapid runoff, “urban 
streams rise more quickly during storms and have higher peak discharge 
rates than do rural streams. In addition, the total volume of water discharged 
during a flood tends to be larger for urban streams than for rural streams.”130 
	
 119  Id. at ES-6. 
 120  Id. at 5-3. 
 121  Id. at 6-6. 
 122  Id. at 4-34. 
 123  Id. at 1-11 to 1-13. 
 124  Id. at 3-23, 3-46. 
 125  Id. at 4-34, 4-42. 
 126  Id. at 3-3, 3-5. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. at 6-6. 
 129  CHRISTOPHER P. KONRAD, EFFECTS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT ON FLOODS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURV. FACT SHEET 076-03 (Nov. 2003), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs07603/pdf/ 
fs07603.pdf. 
 130  Id. 
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In short, the quicker drainage that results from ditches shows significant 
downstream effects to stream flow and timing of high flow events, and thus 
affects sediment and nutrient transport. 
EPA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) requested that the 
Science Advisory Board (SAB) review the draft report,131 and the SAB 
examined “the clarity and technical accuracy of the document; whether it 
includes the most relevant peer-reviewed literature; whether the literature 
has been correctly summarized; and whether the findings and conclusions in 
the Report are supported by the available science.”132 The SAB did not 
discuss ditches directly, but concluded that the “EPA Report is a thorough 
and technically accurate review of the literature on the connectivity of 
streams and wetlands to downstream waters.”133 
In a separate letter, the SAB noted that it had not been asked by EPA 
“to consider the adequacy of the science to support the proposed rule. 
Because this question was not considered during the peer review, [the SAB 
chose to] comment on the scientific and technical basis of the EPA proposed 
rule.”134 As noted below,135 those comments included a conclusion that there 
was “a lack of scientific knowledge to determine whether ditches should be 
categorically excluded. . . . [D]itches may drain areas that would be 
identified as wetlands under the Cowardin classification system and may 
provide certain ecosystem services[,]”136 but the adequacy comments did not 
provide significant additional information on the role of ditches. 
The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFB) criticized the study as 
lacking external peer review, but the results were not met with surprise or 
alarm in the broader academic community.137 And in fact, the exclusion of 
certain ditches from regulation disregards the inconclusive scientific 
information regarding their relationship to water quality, again 
demonstrating the Clean Water Rule is a combination of science, law, policy, 
and deference to principles such as federalism.138 
	
 131  Letter from Dr. David T. Allen, Chair, Sci. Advisory Bd., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 17, 2014), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/ 
WebBoard/AF1A28537854F8AB85257D74005003D2/$File/EPA-SAB-15-001+unsigned.pdf. 
 132  Id. at 1. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Letter from Dr. David T. Allen, Chair, Sci. Advisory Bd., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency 2 (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter SAB Consideration Letter] available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/518D4909D94CB6E585257D6300767DD6/$File/EP
A-SAB-14-007+unsigned.pdf. 
 135  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 136  SAB Consideration Letter, supra note 134, at 3. 
 137  Potential Impacts of Proposed Changes to the Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Rule: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (2014) (written testimony of Bob Stallman, President, 
AFB) (arguing that “the agencies are not properly taking the science into account and that the 
outcomes have been pre-determined”). 
 138  See infra Part IV. 
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III. CWA REGULATION OF DITCHES 
Based on this science, and the SAB review of the science, the Corps and 
EPA drafted the new Clean Water Rule, creating a uniform definition for 
“waters of the United States” to define the jurisdiction of the Act.139 In the 
joint rulemaking, the agencies stated that the definitional rule would apply 
to all provisions of the CWA.140 The regulation specifically amended EPA’s 
regulations implementing sections 301, 304, 306, 311, 402 (National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)), and 404 (dredge and fill) and the 
Corps’ regulations under section 404 (dredge and fill).141 
A. Regulation of Ditches Under the Clean Water Rule 
Ditches created intense controversy, but the Rule’s treatment of ditches 
can be difficult to parse out. To understand how ditches are covered, it is 
necessary to look at the definition of “waters of the United States” as a 
whole. The Clean Water Rule sets out all included waters in paragraph (a) of 
the rule. The Rule identifies the first four categories of jurisdictional waters 
as: 
(1) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be 
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters 
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; 
(2) All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands; 
(3) The territorial seas; 
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of the United 
States under this section.142 
The waters listed under (a)(1) are the “traditional navigable waters.”143 The 
waters under (a)(2) are interstate, and so affect interstate commerce;144 these 
waters are covered even if they are nonnavigable and are isolated from all 
other waters. The Clean Water Rules does not appear to address the 
possibility that ditches may be interstate waters, so it is unclear whether 
interstate ditches, like the ditches that run alongside our national networks 
of highways, fall under this provision. The territorial seas stretch from the 
	
 139  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 140  Id. at 37,104. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. (enacting 33 C.F.R. § 328.2(a)). 
 143  Id. at 37,073. 
 144  Id. at 37,074. These waters have been included in previous versions of the regulation, and 
do not appear to be a source of contention, even though they appear to lie outside the nexus 
requirement established in Rapanos. Id. The final rule provides extensive and convincing 
discussion of why these waters are included under the Act’s jurisdiction. Id. 
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ordinary low water line three miles out into the sea.145 Impoundments 
include both impoundments of waters of the United States (that is, the 
waters listed anywhere else in paragraph (a)) and impoundments of waters 
that do not qualify as waters of the United States, if the impoundment itself 
becomes navigable-in-fact or otherwise makes the water qualify under other 
provisions of paragraph (a).146 These first four categories are not new to the 
definition of “waters of the United States,” instead reflecting the agencies’ 
long-standing practice.147 However, the remaining categories reflect the 
agencies’ response to the Supreme Court’s interpretations discussed above. 
According to the new Clean Water Rule, waters of the United 
States”also include: “(5) All tributaries . . . of waters identified in paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (3) of this section; [and] (6) All waters adjacent to a water 
identified in (a)(1) through (5).” 148 
These first six categories of covered waters are all covered “by rule,” 
meaning that the agencies have determined that they are either traditional 
waters of the United States or categorically have a significant nexus to those 
waters, as required by Justice Kennedy’s rule.149 
Paragraph (a)(5), covering tributaries, is both controversial and 
involved, but the definition of tributaries is where Rapanos really begins to 
influence the new rule.150 The agencies define tributary as follows: 
The term tributary and tributaries each mean a water that contributes flow, 
either directly or through another water (including an impoundment identified 
in paragraph (a)(4) of this section), to a water identified in paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) of this section that is characterized by the presence of the physical 
indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark. These physical 
indicators demonstrate there is volume, frequency, and duration of flow 
sufficient to create a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark, and thus 
to qualify as a tributary. A tributary can be a natural, man-altered, or man-made 
water and includes waters such as rivers, streams, canals, and ditches not 
excluded under paragraph (b) of this section.151 
In short, then, any water body that contributes water to a water falling under 
(a)(1) though (3) and that shows the physical indicators of a bed and banks 
and an ordinary high water mark is a tributary and thus is covered by the Act 
	
 145  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2012). 
 146  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,075. 
 147  See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1983) (EPA); 
Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1987) (Army Corps). 
 148  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104. 
 149  Id. at 37,058. 
 150  Previously, the Corps regulations, at issue in Rapanos discussed above, included 
traditional interstate navigable waters, “[a]ll interstate waters including interstate wetlands[,] 
[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), 
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural 
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign 
commerce[,]” tributaries of such waters, and wetlands adjacent to such waters and tributaries. 
33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2015). 
 151  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105–06. 
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under (a)(5). And once a water is a tributary, it stays a tributary, even if 
downstream it flows through sections that are not waters of the United 
States or if it empties into a water that is not a water of the United States, as 
long as the water eventually enters a water of the United States: 
A water that otherwise qualifies as a tributary under this definition does not 
lose its status as a tributary if, for any length, there are one or more 
constructed breaks (such as bridges, culverts, pipes, or dams), or one or more 
natural breaks (such as wetlands along the run of a stream, debris piles, 
boulder fields, or a stream that flows underground) so long as a bed and banks 
and an ordinary high water mark can be identified upstream of the break. A 
water that otherwise qualifies as a tributary under this definition does not lose 
its status as a tributary if it contributes flow through a water of the United 
States that does not meet the definition of a tributary or through a non-
jurisdictional water to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of 
this section.152 
The rule’s definition of adjacent water is much simpler: the agencies 
use it to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,”153 and include those 
waters separated from other waters of the United States “by constructed 
dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like.”154 Further, 
neighboring waters include all waters located in whole, or in part, “within 
100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of” waters listed under (a)(1) 
through (5);155 all waters within the 100-year floodplain (out to the edge of 
the 100-year floodplain or a distance of 1,500 feet from the ordinary high 
water mark, whichever is closer) of waters listed under (a)(1) through (5);156 
and waters within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a traditional navigable 
water, sea, or the Great Lakes.157 Finally, waters are considered adjacent if 
any part of the water is adjacent to a water of the United States, even if most 
of the water is not adjacent.158 However, the definition of adjacent specifies 
that waters “being used for established normal farming, ranching, and 
silviculture activities” are explicitly not adjacent.159 
Finally, the regulations include a set of “case-specific” waters of the 
United States, in paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8), which lay out the waters that 
will require a specific determination as to whether they have a significant 
nexus with waters listed under paragraphs (a)(1) to (3). Paragraph (a)(7) 
	
 152  Id. at 37,105. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. This addition reflects the agencies’ concern that “[m]any tidally-influenced waters do 
not have floodplains[.]” Id. at 37,085. Neighboring waters would not otherwise be included if the 
rule relied entirely on floodplains. See id. at 37,085–06 (noting that “the agencies include[d] a 
separate provision within the definition of ‘neighboring’ to protect the ‘adjacent’ waters that 
have a significant nexus to tidally-influenced traditional navigable waters or the territorial seas 
or the Great Lakes”).  
 158  Id. at 37,105. 
 159  Id. 
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lists several types of waters that are to be considered as similarly situated, 
so that they are analyzed as one unit for significant nexus purposes.160 
Paragraph (a)(8) lists the additional waters that will be analyzed for a 
significant nexus with waters listed under paragraphs (a)(1) to (3): waters 
that are located within the 100-year floodplain of a traditional navigable 
water, interstate water, or the territorial seas, or within 4,000 feet of the high 
tide line or ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, 
interstate water, the territorial seas, impoundment, or covered tributary.161 
The regulations define significant nexus at paragraph (c)(5): 
A water has a significant nexus when any single function or combination of 
functions performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated 
waters in the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or 
biological integrity of the nearest traditional navigable water, interstate water, 
or the territorial seas. A water may be determined to have a significant nexus 
based on performing any of the following functions: sediment trapping, 
nutrient recycling, pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport, 
retention and attenuation of floodwaters, runoff storage, contribution of flow, 
export of organic matter, export of food resources, or provision of life cycle 
dependent aquatic habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, 
spawning, or use as a nursery area) for species located in a traditional 
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.162 
Waters not falling under any of these eight categories are not protected by 
the CWA.163 Moreover, many waters that do fall under categories (a)(4) 
through (8) are still not protected by the CWA, because the new rule 
explicitly excludes them. The exclusions include the longstanding 
exclusions for some agricultural waters,164 new exclusions for a variety of 
manmade features,165 and the new exclusions at issue here—the additional 
exclusions for particular ditches.166 Exclusions are meant to take precedence 
over inclusion, so that if one of the exclusions is triggered it removes the 
feature from jurisdiction even if the feature would otherwise meet the 
categories of inclusion under (a)(4) through (8).167 Waters described in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) are not subject to exclusion.168 
The Clean Water Rule did not change the statutory or regulatory 
exemptions from NPDES permitting requirements for agricultural 
stormwater discharges, prior converted cropland, return flows from 
irrigated agriculture, or the lack of required permitting for water transfers.169 
	
 160  Id. at 37,104–05. 
 161  Id. at 37,105. 
 162  Id. at 37,093. 
 163  Id. at 37,096. 
 164  Id. at 37,105. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Collectively these exemptions have been much criticized as agricultural activities have 
caused serious environmental harms and degradation. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, 
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The regulations exclude a number of manmade features that were 
generally susceptible to case-by-case determinations under prior rules: 
(i) Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should application 
of irrigation water to that area cease; 
(ii) Artificial, constructed lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or diking 
dry land such as farm and stock watering ponds, irrigation ponds, settling 
basins, log cleaning ponds, cooling ponds, or fields flooded for rice growing; 
(iii) Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created by excavating and/or 
diking dry land; 
(iv) Small ornamental waters created by excavating and/or diking dry land for 
primarily aesthetic reasons; 
(v) Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to mining or 
construction activity, including pits excavated for obtaining fill, sand or gravel 
that fill with water; 
(vi) Erosional features, including gullies, rills, and other ephemeral features 
that do not meet the definition of tributary, non-wetland swales, and lawfully 
constructed grassed waterways; and 
(vii) Puddles170 
The exclusion that is the focus of this Article is the specific exclusion of 
specified ditches. This provision excludes: 
(i) Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary or excavated 
in a tributary. 
(ii) Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated tributary, excavated 
in a tributary, or drain wetlands. 
(iii) Ditches that do not flow, either directly or through another water, into a 
water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.171 
	
The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (2013) 
(noting significant exemptions from CWA for agriculture and identifying alternative means to 
regulate pollution through remaining CWA authorities). Some water transfers may require a 
NPDES permit, although the Supreme Court in South Florida Water Management District v. 
Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), declined to rule on the interpretation promoted by the 
government that water bodies in the U.S. should be viewed as one unit. Id. at 108–09. See also 
Mary Jane Angelo & Jon Morris, Maintaining a Healthy Water Supply While Growing a Healthy 
Food Supply: Legal Tools for Cleaning Up Agricultural Water Pollution, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1003 
(2014) (emphasizing impacts to water quality from agricultural activities and examining 
intersection of CWA and agriculture for potential improvements).  
 170  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105. 
 171  Id.; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4)–(8), (b)(3) (2015).  
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The agencies did not adopt formal definitions of “ephemeral,” “intermittent,” 
or “perennial” flow, instead asserting that the terms are commonly used 
scientific terms.172 According to the preamble to the Clean Water Rule, 
ephemeral waters “have flowing water only in response to precipitation 
events in a typical year, and are always above the water table.”173 Intermittent 
waters “have both precipitation and groundwater providing part of the 
stream’s flow, and flow continuously only during certain times of the year 
(e.g., during certain seasons such as the rainy season).”174 A ditch relocates a 
stream if at least a portion of the stream’s original channel has been 
physically moved, or when the majority of its flow has been redirected.175 A 
ditch that is a relocated stream is a water of the United States if it meets the 
definition of tributary and is not otherwise excluded.176 
As the exclusion notes, even if the ditch is an impoundment of waters, 
an adjacent water, or a water meeting the significant nexus test, it is 
nevertheless excluded under this provision.177 For the first two exclusions, 
the ephemeral and intermittent flowing ditches not relocating a tributary or 
excavated in a tributary (or for intermittent flowing ditches not draining a 
wetland), the ditch “is not jurisdictional even when the ditch connects 
directly or through another water to a traditional navigable water, interstate 
water, or the territorial seas.”178 Finally, the regulation notes that all 
“[d]itches protected by the rule must meet the definition of tributary, having 
a bed and banks and ordinary high water mark, and contributing flow 
directly or indirectly through another water to a traditional navigable water, 
interstate water, or the territorial seas.”179 
From another angle, this means that the only ditches covered by the 
CWA are those that “meet the definition of tributary,”180 and are a relocated 
or an excavated tributary, or have intermittent flows and drain a wetland, or 
have perennial flows.181 In sum, a ditch must both be a tributary and not be 
excluded in order to be jurisdictional. 
B. Rationale for Using “Exclusion” to Address Ditches 
The agencies explained that the definition of “waters of the United 
States” for purposes of the CWA reflects a combination of the statute, best 
available peer-reviewed science, the Supreme Court’s decisions, and agency 
	
 172  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076. 
 173  Id.  
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. at 37,078. 
 176  Id. 
 177  See id.; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4)–(8), (b)(3) (ditch exclusion). 
 178  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,096 (explaining that waters and features excluded under paragraph (b) 
are not “waters of the United States” even if they would otherwise qualify under paragraphs 
(a)(4)–(a)(8)). 
 179  Id. at 37,078 (emphasis added). This is not an exclusion per se, but an artifact of EPA’s 
categorical treatment of tributaries, the class to which a ditch would almost certainly belong. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
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technical expertise and experience.182 The agencies admit that their 
exclusion decisions in particular are not based solely on the science, in a 
particularly inchoate explanation at the beginning of the summary of the 
exclusions.183 And even this admission falls short; the exclusion of ditches is 
not primarily for the purpose of maintaining environmental integrity of 
water resources or a reflection of the science.184 The agencies admit as much. 
Instead, the exclusions are justified primarily by reference to the agencies’ 
past practice and the interest in clarity and consistency.185 Indeed, the SAB 
review of the rule emphasized that there is not conclusive evidence that the 
excluded ditches fail to have an important influence on downstream 
waters.186 In its response to comments on the Proposed Rule, the agencies 
recognized the balance of interests at stake in adopting the ditch 
exclusions.187 
Regarding the scientific basis of the ditch exclusions, EPA stated: 
[T]he agencies recognize that many ditches provide similar functions as 
tributaries. In its review of the science support for the Proposed Rule, the EPA 
Science Advisory Board stated, “certain other exclusions listed in the Proposed 
Rule and the current regulation do not have scientific justification. There is, for 
example, a lack of scientific knowledge to determine whether ditches should 
be categorically excluded” . . . . Nonetheless, while there may remain some 
uncertainty in the science, the agencies have determined that it is important to 
clarify the status of ditches to make implementation of the Act more 
understandable and consistent, and to reinforce long-standing practices and 
priorities. As a result, the rule codifies the longstanding policy of the agencies 
to consider certain ditches as not subject to regulatory protection as “waters of 
the United States.”188 
The agencies’ quotation of the SAB scientific adequacy review perhaps 
undersells the criticism. 
The SAB went on to note that: 
Many ditches in the Midwest would be excluded under the proposed rule 
because they were excavated wholly in uplands, drain only uplands, and have 
less than perennial flow. However, these ditches may drain areas that would be 
identified as wetlands . . . and may provide certain ecosystem services. . . . 
	
 182  Id. at 37,055. 
 183  Id. at 37,097 (noting that the agencies rely, alternately, on longstanding agency practice, 
the plurality (but not the concurrence) in Rapanos, the difficultly of line drawing, and the 
benefits of simplifying the process). All of the factors relied upon are legitimate, perhaps, but 
the list certainly suggests the agencies had a difficult time finding a solid footing for the 
exclusion. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id. at 37,065. 
 187  Id. at 37,097. 
 188  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP’T OF THE ARMY, CLEAN WATER RULE RESPONSE TO 
COMMENTS, TOPIC 6: DITCHES 23 (2015), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
2015-06/documents/cwr_response_to_comments_6_ditches.pdf [hereinafter EPA RESPONSE TO 
COMMENTS] (quoting SAB Consideration Letter, supra note 134, at 3).  
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Also, although excluded from jurisdiction under the proposed rule, artificial 
lakes or ponds, or reflection pools, created by excavation, diking, or 
construction can be directly connected to jurisdictional waters by 
groundwater, which may be shallow as well as deep groundwater in 
unconfined aquifers.189 
The science suggests that ditches would have been best placed with the 
waters under paragraph (a)(8), those waters for which a case-by-case 
determination must be made.190 Even the structure of the rule suggests that 
the exclusion lacks a scientific rationale; if the waters identified in (a)(4) 
though (6) are waters that, as a rule, have a significant nexus with the waters 
of the United States, and the ditches must be excluded from those 
categories, then the ditches must generally also have a significant nexus 
with the waters of the United States. There would be no need to exclude 
them if they wouldn’t merit coverage under those paragraphs. Finally, the 
agencies continued the policy of regulating certain ditches: ditches that are 
constructed in or relocate tributaries; certain ditches that drain wetlands; 
and ditches that function as a tributary.191 
If not for science, then, what is the purpose of an exclusion for specific 
ditches? The agencies suggest it is for the sake of certainty and clarity: “The 
rule further reduces existing confusion and inconsistency regarding the 
regulation of ditches by explicitly excluding certain categories of ditches, 
such as ditches that flow only after precipitation.”192 To support the assertion 
that clarity would be achieved by following past practice, the agencies note 
that an exclusion for particular ditches has been in preamble language 
documents since 1986 for the Corps and EPA in 1988, and suggest that this is 
simply the first time the exclusions are being established by rule.193 This does 
not appear to be true. The largely identical 1986 and 1988 preambles 
exempted, “[c]onstruction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or 
irrigation ditches, or the maintenance (but not construction) of drainage 
ditches,”194 but only if those activities were not for the purpose of 
“convert[ing] an area of the waters of the United States into a use to which it 
was not previously subject,”195 and not if “the proposed discharge will result 
in significant discernible alterations to flow or circulation.”196 The 1986 and 
1988 preambles also excluded irrigation ditches excavated on dry land,197 but 
gave the agencies the right to determine whether those ditches were covered 
	
 189  SAB Consideration Letter, supra note 134, at 3. 
 190  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105; CONNECTIVITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 1-11 to 1-13 
(discussing the hydrological connectivity of ditches). 
 191  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,078. 
 192  Id. at 37,058. 
 193  Id. at 37,059. 
 194  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 
41,234 (Nov. 13, 1986); Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Exemptions, 53 
Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,775 (June 6, 1988). 
 195  51 Fed. Reg. at 41,234; 53 Fed. Reg. at 20,774–75.  
 196  51 Fed. Reg. at 41,234; 53 Fed. Reg. at 20,775. 
 197  51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217; 53 Fed. Reg. at 20,765. 
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by the Act on a case-by-case basis.198 These “preamble exclusions” exclude 
far fewer ditches and are certainly not the exclusions contained in the 
current iteration of the regulations. The exclusions under consideration here 
are new and represent a contraction of the agencies’ claimed jurisdiction 
under the CWA. What would drive the agencies to give up these waters? 
C. Role of Ditches in Agriculture 
Moving water is critical for farming. Farmers must move both dirt and 
water as a regular part of operations.199 Ditches are often used for irrigation 
purposes so that crops receive water needed to grow.200 AFB specifically 
identified concerns that the rule would capture irrigation ditches, which 
AFB emphasized flow either perennially or intermittently.201 In stakeholder 
meetings and consultations, the farming community sought assurances from 
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy that these ditches would be excluded 
from regulation, but the Clean Water Rule does not specifically exempt a 
ditch based on whether the ditch is for irrigation purposes.202 
The agencies nonetheless emphasized the continuation of existing 
exemptions for agriculture. As noted above, ditches must meet the definition 
of a tributary and not be otherwise excluded to be waters of the United 
States.203 Moreover, the definition of adjacent waters specifically excludes 
waters being used for established “normal farming, ranching, and silviculture 
activities.”204 Irrigation return flows continue to receive an exemption from 
section 402 NPDES permitting requirements pursuant to section 402(l)(1).205 
Under section 404(f)(1)(A) farmers are exempted from otherwise applicable 
CWA permitting provisions for moving dirt such as is necessary for plowing 
and planting and for minor drainage.206 Section 404(f)(1)(C) asserts that 
	
 198  51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217; 53 Fed. Reg. at 20,765. 
 199  See W.R. WALKER, U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNING AND 
EVALUATING SURFACE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 6.1 (1989), available at http://www.fao.org 
/docrep/t0231e/t0231e08.htm#6.1. 
 200  Id. at 2.4.2, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/t0231e/t0231e04.htm#2.4.2. 
 201  AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, FACT OR FICTION: SHEDDING THE LIGHT ON EPA’S “FACTS” ABOUT 
THE NEW “WATERS OF THE U.S.” RULE 5–6 (2015) available at http://www.fb.org/tmp/ 
uploads/FACT_or_FICTION-Copy.pdf [hereinafter Fact or Fiction]. 
 202  Id.; Christine Souza, Clean Water Act: Farm Bureau Takes Its Case to Head of EPA, 
AGALERT, May 28, 2014, http://www.agalert.com/story/?id=6794 (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 203  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,076 (June 29, 2015). 
 204  Id. at 37,055. 
 205  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (2012). 
 206  Id. § 1344(f)(1)(A). The statute makes these activities “[n]on-prohibited discharge[s] of 
dredged or fill material[s]” so long as the recapture provision of section 404(f)(2) is not 
triggered. That section provides that the activities cannot bring navigable waters into a new use 
or change the flow, circulation or reach of navigable waters. Specifically:  
[a]ny discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any 
activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which 
it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be 
impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit 
under this section. 
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“construction or maintenance of . . . irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of 
drainage ditches” are non-prohibited discharges of dredged or fill material.207 
The agencies also noted that, as these exemptions specific to ditches were 
adopted by Congress in 1977, it confirmed the understanding that ditches 
would be covered by the Act, and identified only specific activities (and 
parameters for those activities) that are exempted from a section 404 
permit.208 
Agriculture presents a continuing challenge for water quality based 
particularly on its nonpoint source nature which largely brings it outside of 
federal control under the CWA.209 Typical water pollutants include sediment, 
nutrients, fertilizers, pesticides, minerals, and pathogens.210 Despite 
producing harm to the environment such as water quality impacts, 
sedimentation, and habitat fragmentation, agriculture is subject to less 
regulation than activities that produce similar environmental harms.211 
Agriculture plays a particularly important role in the economy of many 
states. As noted by other scholars, “because agriculture is economically 
important to local economics, county and municipal governments hesitate to 
place restrictions on the farming operations.”212 
D. Reception of the Rule 
The proposed rule had two explicit exemptions for ditches, first for 
ditches draining only uplands not excavated in or relocating a tributary, and 
second for ditches not connected to categories (a)(1)–(4)—traditional 
navigable waters, intrastate waters, territorial seas, and impoundments of 
the prior categories.213 From the agricultural community, including ranchers 
and farmers, reaction was swift and negative.214 Many comments addressed 
	
Id. § 1344(f)(2). The exemption has been interpreted by the agencies to be applicable to ongoing 
farming operations. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE CLEAN WATER RULE FACT CHECK, available at 
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_fact_check_clean_water_ 
rule.pdf. 
 207  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(C). This section is also subject to the limitation on recapture. Id. 
§ 1344(f)(2). 
 208  EPA RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 188, at 22. 
 209  See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (prohibiting discharges of pollutants without a permit); id. 
§ 1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source”). 
 210  J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 13 
(2002). 
 211  J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
263, 266, 293–305 (2000) (inventorying the farmer exemptions from the CWA). 
 212  Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural 
Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2013).  
 213  Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 
79 Fed. Reg. 22,188, 22,193 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 
C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).  
 214  Ron Nixon, EPA’s Proposed Rules on Water Worries Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, 
at A17. 
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ditches and asked specifically for the exclusion of roadside ditches.215 The 
rule was criticized as unduly confusing.216 In particular, comments addressed 
the use of the ambiguous term “uplands,” which was part of the first of the 
two exemptions.217 The agencies revised the proposed rule, eliminating the 
term uplands and breaking exemptions into three categories as identified 
above.218 
AFB began a campaign to “Ditch the Rule.” AFB created social media 
and a website to promote the message encouraging the agencies to abandon 
the rulemaking process.219 AFB also emphasized that the agencies, by 
proposing the rule, did not have knowledge about farming activities and 
were seeking to manage land uses by way of CWA regulation.220 The 
campaign was a means to put the agencies on the defensive about the scope 
of the rule. 
EPA in response released more fact sheets to “Ditch the Myth.”221 The 
fact sheets emphasized the continued exemptions for certain agricultural 
activities and that the exemptions for ditches specifically were meant to 
clarify that activities near ditches that only filled when it rained would not 
be subject to regulation.222 The agencies also emphasized their effort to work 
with the USDA to incorporate concerns of agricultural stakeholders into the 
new rule.223 
Using the notion of ditches and “ditching” the rulemaking effort was an 
effective public campaign against the rule.224 AFB and related supporters 
raised alarm at the extent to which previously unregulated drainage and 
irrigation features may be regulated, and emphasizing the term helped to 
trivialize the impacts from manmade features.225 The president of AFB, Bob 
Stallman is quoted as saying that “we build a lot of fences in Texas . . . [a]nd 
	
 215  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,097 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, & 401). 
 216  COPELAND, supra note 25, at 9. 
 217  80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, http://ditchtherule.fb.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 220  Timothy Cama, Farm Bureau Pledges to Fight EPA’s Water Rule, HILL Apr. 22, 2014, 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/204096-farm-bureau-pledges-to-fight-epas-water-
rule (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 221  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DITCH THE MYTH (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2014-07/documents/ditch_the_myth_wotus.pdf. 
 222  Id. at 3. These efforts were rebuked by a GAO legal opinion that concluded EPA had 
violated the law in its social media campaign to “ditch the myth.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., B-326944, OPINION STATEMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY—APPLICATION OF 
PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA AND ANTI-LOBBYING PROVISIONS (2015), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/680/674163.pdf. 
 223  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACT EXCLUSIONS AND EXEMPTIONS CONTINUE FOR 
AGRICULTURE 1–2 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03 
/documents/cwa_ag_exclusions_exemptions.pdf. 
 224  Cama, supra note 220 (noting that AFB President Bob Stallman stated that AFB would 
focus on “work . . . in the public arena” to point out the consequences of the rule).  
 225  Id. 
11_TO JCI.SALCIDO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016  1:04 PM 
2016] DITCHING OUR INNOCENCE 443 
somehow, that we’re going to need a permit from the EPA and the Corps of 
Engineers . . . is just laughable.”226 
After EPA released fact sheets to help explain and garner support for 
the rule, AFB continued to emphasize the confusion that may be caused by 
the definition of “tributary” and how that could lead to regulation of farming 
activities.227 Moreover, AFB emphasized that the agencies were playing 
defense, because it would not otherwise have to build public support for the 
rule, but given the strength of opposition to the rule there had already been 
congressional attention and bill drafting to overturn the agencies’ 
rulemaking effort to define “waters of the United States.”228 
E. Ditches and the Significant Nexus 
Regulation of ditches is controversial because they are manmade, and 
they often flow intermittently. At the outset of this analysis of the ditches 
exclusion, one must first dispel any fear that the existing Supreme Court 
case law somehow treats ditches or other manmade features differently than 
natural features. To the contrary, when they address the question even 
obliquely, the Supreme Court cases leading up to this rulemaking actually 
presume that manmade features are treated no differently than natural water 
bodies under the Act. 
The first case, Riverside Bayview, appears to have neither explicitly nor 
implicitly considered the manmade question.229 In contrast, in SWANCC the 
issue is conspicuous by its absence. The water at issue was an “abandoned 
sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois,”230 a conspicuously manmade 
landscape feature, but the majority never mentions the lake’s origin in its 
decision excluding the lake from the Act’s jurisdiction. And the dissent 
decides that the lake’s anthropogenic origin does not even merit mention. 
Finally, in Rapanos, a willingness to ignore the anthropogenic origins of 
a water body is perhaps the only bit of reasoning that the plurality, 
concurrence, and dissent all share, beyond reading navigable waters more 
broadly than was traditional prior to the passage of the CWA. The plurality 
spends a long 400-word footnote examining and bolstering its argument that 
point sources, which would be excluded from consideration as navigable 
waters under its reading of the Act, are characterized in part by their 
intermittent flow.231 The plurality was seeking to give the traditional phrase 
“navigable water” more value, emphasizing that giving the phrase a limited 
effect would at minimum require “the ordinary presence of water.”232 The 
opinion took particular aim to criticize the expansive definition of tributary 
	
 226  Id. 
 227  Fact or Fiction, supra note 201. 
 228  Id. AFB also suggested that the agencies had named the rule “the Clean Water Rule” 
because no one would want to challenge the need for clean water. Id.  
 229  See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 230  SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001). 
 231  Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 736–37, 737 n.7 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 232  Id. at 734. 
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including intermittent streams, citing to lower court decisions discussed 
below.233 The opinion is very critical of the Corps’ determinations in the field 
including as jurisdictional various “man-made, intermittently flowing 
features.”234 
Yet nowhere does the plurality suggest that manmade features should 
be excluded because they are manmade. In fact, the plurality (by way of 
footnote) suggests that manmade features like moats or canals would fall 
under the Act’s jurisdiction.235 The footnote also suggests that the Act “does 
not treat such elaborate, man-made, enclosed systems [such as pipes or 
sewer systems] as ‘waters’ on a par with ‘streams,’ ‘rivers,’ and ‘oceans.’”236 
Certainly, these examples suggest that manmade systems that are not 
enclosed, but rather interact with the traditionally navigable waters, are 
almost certainly jurisdictional. If there were any question, the plurality 
cleans it up in its conclusion. There, the plurality drew no distinction 
between manmade tributaries and natural tributaries, telling the lower 
courts that they “should determine, in the first instance, whether the ditches 
or drains near each wetland are ‘waters’ in the ordinary sense of containing a 
relatively permanent flow.”237 
Similarly, the dissent and the concurrence by Justice Kennedy discuss 
ditches and other manmade features with no suggestion that they should be 
excluded.238 For his part, Justice Kennedy rejected the plurality’s narrow 
view that would exclude intermittent waters.239 After giving one example 
from California—the Los Angeles River—he concludes that the Corps could 
	
 233  Id. at 725–29. 
 234  Id. at 727–28. 
 235  Id. at 736 n.7.  
 236  Id. at 736–37, 737 n.7. 
 237  Id. at 757 (emphasis added). 
 238  Id. at 804 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because there is ambiguity in the phrase ‘waters of 
the United States’ and because interpreting it broadly to cover such ditches and streams 
advances the purpose of the Act, the Corps’ approach should command our deference.”); id. at 
787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remanding for consideration of the significance of the 
connections between the wetlands at issue and the traditional navigable waters, a connection 
mediated entirely by manmade ditches). 
 239  Id. at 768–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court’s breakdown on the importance of 
water in defining a stream may have some relationship to the Justices’ sense of place. In the 
west, many of our streams only flow for a short time each year, and much of our geography 
centers on streams that, at first glance, look like dry gravel beds. See CRAIG CHILDS, THE SECRET 
KNOWLEDGE OF WATER 195–97 (Back Bay Books 2001) (noting that the iconic geography of some 
of the driest places on Earth, the deserts of the southwest, are created in large part by 
ephemeral water flows). In the West, then, perhaps the idea of a stream simply doesn’t rely on a 
relatively permanent flow of water. This is reflected in the Justices’ opinions in Rapanos: Of all 
the Justices, only “Breyer and Kennedy[] grew up west of the Mississippi River, and only 
Kennedy spent any part of his professional career there.” A. E. Dick Howard, The Changing 
Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L. REV. 231, 250 (2015). Most of the other Justices come 
from wet states that border the Atlantic Ocean. Id. at 250–51; see also William J. Daniels, The 
Geographic Factor in Appointments to the United States Supreme Court: 1789–1976, 31 W. POL. 
Q. 226, 232 (1978) (finding that the eastern United States is more represented on the Supreme 
Court than the western United States, by a ratio of nearly six to one); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC 
DESERT 12 (1986) (discussing generally the different ways that folks in the eastern and western 
United States look at streams, rivers, and water). 
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“reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such impermanent 
streams.”240 The Clean Water Rule also uses the Los Angeles River as an 
example—that of a river that has been manipulated, yet, does not lose its 
character as a tributary “even where it has been ditched, channelized, or 
concreted.”241 However, Justice Kennedy was also skeptical of the Corps 
definition of tributary—which included waters that feed into a traditional 
navigable water (or its tributary) and have an ordinary high water mark 
(OHWM).242 Justice Kennedy questioned inclusion of––as he called it––
“minor tributaries,” whose flows are so small they would be unable to meet 
the significant nexus test he outlines.243 He questioned whether the definition 
used by the Corps that relied on OHWM was a reasonable measure of 
“volume and regularity of flow” such that consistent application would in 
fact ensure the significant nexus with traditional navigable waters required 
to find that a minor tributary is a jurisdictional water.244 Two facts animate 
his concern—the remoteness of the tributary to navigable water, and the 
irregularity of flow.245 In criticizing the definition of tributary (incorporating 
OHWM standard) and rejecting adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries as per 
se sufficient to claim a wetland is also jurisdictional, Justice Kennedy 
asserts: 
The breadth of this standard—which seems to leave wide room for regulation 
of drains, ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water and 
carrying only minor water volumes toward it—precludes its adoption as the 
determinative measure of whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play an 
important role in the integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable 
waters as traditionally understood.246 
Comparing the situation to the facts in SWANCC, he notes that wetlands 
adjacent to such tributaries may bear less relation than the ponds rejected as 
beyond jurisdiction in that case.247 
	
 240  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 770 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy argues that the 
majority’s definition including continuously flowing waters would arguably be too inclusive by 
potentially regulating waters without a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters. Id. at 
769 (noting that the “merest trickle, if continuous, would count as a ‘water’ subject to federal 
regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry channels 
would not”). 
 241  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,078 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 242  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. 
 245  Justice Kennedy characterizes the Corps’ theory of jurisdiction in the consolidated cases 
as “adjacency to tributaries, however remote and insubstantial.” Id. at 780. 
 246  Id. at 781 (emphasis added). 
 247  Id. at 781–82. He asserts that adjacency to a navigable-in-fact water alone is sufficient but 
“[a]bsent more specific regulations, however, the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a 
case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable 
tributaries.” Id. at 782.  
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Justice Kennedy’s suggestion was that adjacency might be sufficient not 
just for traditional navigable waters, but also for “major tributaries.” He 
noted that, either by rulemaking or adjudication, the 
Corps may choose to identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume 
of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or 
other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to 
them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an 
aquatic system incorporating navigable waters.248 
The Corps had previously interpreted its regulations as including as 
jurisdictional those ditches that had an ordinary high water mark.249 Applying 
the Corps’ interpretation of intermittent tributaries, many circuit courts 
endorsed the view that manmade ditches and canals are tributaries to 
navigable waters, even when flows from these features are intermittent.250 
Unlike the Justices in the Rapanos plurality, lower courts working with the 
facts in particular cases had no trouble explaining the rationale behind this 
regulatory approach. Neither the underlying fact of its manmade character 
or the lack of permanent flow prevented the features in question from 
having a substantial influence over the physical, chemical, and biological 
integrity of downstream natural waters. It is simply unprincipled to draw a 
line at manmade or at intermittently flowing to define jurisdiction. 
For example, in Headwaters Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District,251 the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that tributaries that flow intermittently are waters of the 
United States.252 In Headwaters, the defendant applied an aquatic herbicide 
to manmade irrigation canals.253 The irrigation canals exchanged waters with 
a natural creek and at least one lake that were uncontested waters of the 
United States.254 Thus, the irrigation canals were found to be waters of the 
United States themselves as tributaries.255 The Ninth Circuit refused to apply 
the logic of SWANCC, as these were not “isolated waters” but actually 
connected to other waters from which they exchanged and diverted water.256 
The defendant contested the conclusion because the canals were engineered 
to be a closed loop system separated from natural waters during herbicide 
application.257 The defendant argued that its system of waste gates prevented 
the herbicide from reaching natural streams.258 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
the effectiveness of the gates in preventing flows to natural streams was 
	
 248  Id. at 780–81. 
 249  Id. at 725 (plurality opinion). 
 250  See, e.g., infra notes 251–272 and accompanying text. 
 251  243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 252  Id. at 534. 
 253  Id. at 528. 
 254  Id. at 528–29, 532.  
 255  Id. at 533 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that irrigation canals were waters of 
the United States as tributaries to waters of the United States). 
 256  Id. 
 257  Id.  
 258  Id. at 533–34. 
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contested.259 Past incidents of leaks from the canals had resulted in fish kills 
on two prior occasions.260 The Ninth Circuit then concluded that regardless 
of whether the system was effective at preventing exchange of waters with 
natural streams at some times (making flow intermittent) did not overcome 
its definition as waters of the United States, and thus regulation of 
discharges to the irrigation canal.261 The Ninth Circuit in Headwaters cited to 
the Eleventh Circuit, which reached the same conclusion regarding 
intermittent flows from manmade ditches and canals.262 
The Rapanos plurality also criticized the reasoning of United States v. 
Deaton.263 The plaintiffs challenged application of the tributary regulation to 
their roadside ditch in Deaton.264 They argued that the ditch did not meet the 
definition of “tributary” or that it was not a “tributary of a navigable water” 
because the ditch did not discharge directly to a navigable water but 
indirectly through other nonnavigable tributaries.265 The plaintiffs contended 
that “tributary” meant only the nonnavigable branches that empty directly 
into navigable waters.266 This interpretation was roundly rejected.267 
In Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, LLP,268 the Fourth Circuit emphasized 
its earlier holding in Deaton.269 “To the extent that Newdunn challenges the 
Corps’ decision to label the manmade, I–64 ditch a ‘tributary,’ that argument 
has also been foreclosed by Deaton. . . . That the I–64 ditch at issue in the 
present case is a manmade rather than a natural watercourse is an irrelevant 
distinction.”270 The Fourth Circuit explained therein that the fact it is a 
manmade watercourse makes no principled difference. The court cited the 
Corps rationale directly: 
As the Corps has explained: The discharge of a pollutant into a waterway 
generally has the same effect downstream whether the waterway is natural or 
manmade. Indeed, given the extensive human modification of watercourses 
and hydrologic systems throughout the country, it would be difficult to identify 
a principled basis in this case for distinguishing between natural watercourses 
and watercourses that are wholly or partly manmade or modified.271 
	
 259  Id. at 533. 
 260  Id. 
 261  Id. at 534. 
 262  Id. (noting that manmade ditches and canals flowing intermittently into a creek could be 
tributaries (citing United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1997))).  
 263  332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 726–27 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 264  332 F.3d at 704. 
 265  Id. at 704, 708 (emphasis omitted).  
 266  Id. at 710. 
 267  Id. at 710–12. 
 268  344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 269  Id. at 417. 
 270  Id. 
 271  Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 48–49, Treacy, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-
1480, 02-1594)). 
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This exact explanation is provided in support of the new Clean Water Rule 
approach to tributaries and ditches.272 
IV. THE ECOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DITCHES 
The agencies exclude several types of ditches outright. Examples of 
ditches that would be excluded under the new rule include most roadside 
ditches,273 ditches dug to redirect flows away from croplands,274 and many 
kinds of irrigation ditches.275 The legal kerfuffle over these ditches and other 
manmade waters may not matter at all, of course, if what we do with our 
ditches has no impact on water quality and ecosystem health. But the 
science on these ditches, as outlined in EPA’s supporting documents and the 
two SAB reviews, suggests that ditches may play a significant role in 
connectivity and ecosystem health. Further, our independent review of the 
science highlights many instances where our ditches have meaningful 
impacts on their ecosystems and watersheds. 
For example, a study of seven roadside ditches in central New York 
examined Escherichia coli (E. coli) concentrations in water samples 
following storm events.276 The streams bordered either forested lands or 
manure-amended fields, and the scientists found concentrations of E. coli in 
both types of ditches that often exceeded New York State and EPA 
standards.277 The study noted, 
The cumulative pollutant contribution from the ditch network was estimated 
to be large enough to produce detectable and sometimes high concentrations 
in a receiving stream in a small, rural watershed. Roadside drainage networks 
need to be actively managed for water quality improvements, because they 
capture and rapidly shunt stormwater and associated contaminants to 
streams.278 
More broadly, the study found that “22% of the watersheds are draining 
to the roadside ditch network rather than to the natural stream channels,” 
and noted that “[r]oadside ditches can therefore act as a pathway for non-
point source pollution transport from the road surface itself, which is 
frequently characterized by low water quality.”279 The description of the 
studied ditches—vegetated bottoms, water present only after rainfall 
events—strongly suggests that these ditches, like other roadside ditches, 
would fall within the agencies’ exclusion and thus would not be covered by 
	
 272  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,078 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 273  Id. at 37,105. 
 274  Id.  
 275  Id.  
 276  Kimberly Falbo et al., Roadside Ditches as Conduits of Fecal Indicator Organisms and 
Sediment: Implications for Water Quality Management, 128 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1050 (2013). 
 277  Id. at 1052, 1056. 
 278  Id. at 1050. 
 279  Id. 
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the CWA, even though they make a significant contribution to watershed 
water quality: “When scaled up to a small, rural watershed, the loads from 
the roadside ditch network for [E. coli was] estimated to be large enough to 
degrade stream water quality.”280 In the scientists’ own words, “we conclude 
that roadside ditches are acting as conduits for bacterial and sediment water 
pollution from lands high up in the watershed and are contributing to 
downstream degraded water quality.”281 And manmade networks of ditches 
and other water channels are a “very significant contribution” to a basin’s 
hydrologic response; absent these features, “the peak discharges would be 
lower and the recession longer, and nearly all runoff would be surface 
runoff.”282 Change in water quality? In flow dynamics? That certainly sounds 
like these ditches do in fact have an impact on water quality and ecosystem 
health.  
Ditches also make significant contributions to biodiversity within their 
watersheds. One study found that invertebrate and fish communities 
between ditches with perennial flow that were not connected to a water of 
the United States had comparable biodiversity and abundance to nearby 
streams and connected ditches,283 and the authors cautioned that “[d]itches, 
while not natural within the environment, should be removed with caution 
since the loss of species richness may have large and unintended 
consequences on the system.”284 Other studies examined the importance of 
ditches to small mammal diversity285 and frog and toad diversity.286 Ditches 
have even provided refuge habitats for endangered species during periods of 
drought.287 Ditches are an understudied geographic feature, as noted in the 
SAB review,288 but every time we look closely at a ditch, we seem to find 
connections to the surrounding ecosystem and watershed. Of course, not 
	
 280  Id. at 1056. 
 281  Id. at 1057. 
 282  Nadia Carluer & Ghislain De Marsily, Assessment and Modeling of the Influence of Man-
Made Networks on the Hydrology of a Small Watershed: Implications for Fast Flow 
Components, Water Quality and Landscape Management, 285 J. HYDROLOGY 76, 93 (2004). 
 283  Troy N. Simon & Joseph Travis, The Contribution of Man-Made Ditches to the Regional 
Stream Biodiversity of the New River Watershed in the Florida Panhandle, 661 HYDROBIOLOGIA 
163, 169 (2011). 
 284  Id. at 174. 
 285  Justin D. Hoffman et al., Effects of Land Use and Soil Texture on Distributions of Pocket 
Gophers in Kansas, 52 SW. NATURALIST 296, 300 (2007) (“In most agricultural areas of Kansas, 
small mammal species are abundant and widespread in refugia provided by roadside 
ditches . . . . This illustrates the importance of protecting roadside ditches and other patches of 
natural vegetation from agricultural development.”). 
 286  Jessica A. Homyack et al., Anuran Assemblages Associated with Roadside Ditches in a 
Managed Pine Landscape, 334 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 217, 225 (2014) (“[I]n managed forests 
of the Atlantic Coastal Plain, roadside ditches are contributing to regional occupancy of 
anurans and likely population persistence of a group of species reportedly in decline.”). 
Anurans are frogs and toads. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (3d ed. 1971). 
 287  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RIO GRANDE SILVERY MINNOW DRAFT REVISED RECOVERY 
PLAN 25 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/Documents/R2ES/Rio_Grande_ 
Silvery_Minnow_DRAFT_Recovery_Plan_Jan-2007.pdf (indicating that an endangered minnow 
survives in ditches during periods when the middle Rio Grande has no flow). 
 288  SAB Consideration Letter, supra note 134, at 3. 
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every ditch is going to be significant, but to the extent that some are, a case-
by-case analysis would more accurately identify which should be regulated. 
 Excluding ditches without any analysis simply has no basis in science, 
and is likely to exclude many waters with a significant nexus to traditional 
navigable waters. Leaving these waters out of the Act exposes them both to 
total destruction through the addition of fill and to discharge of pollutants 
into wet and dry ditches.289  
V. PROTECTING CREATED LANDSCAPE FEATURES IN THE AGE OF THE 
ANTHROPOCENE 
Many possibilities beyond an unwillingness to regulate manmade places 
could explain the Agencies’ decision to exclude most ditches from CWA 
coveragefederalism and deference to state control of land use, deference 
to private property rights, or even an unwillingness to take on agricultural 
interests are all potential explanations. 
Some measure of the controversy over ditches is animated by the 
structure of the CWA, which authorizes the federal government to address 
point source pollution and the states to address nonpoint source pollution, 
which includes much of the pollution that ends up in ditches.290 But this 
structure doesn’t prevent the rule from including ditches, and the evidence 
suggests it must do so if they are to receive protection, because states will 
not do so on their own. States are ill-equipped—even if politically inclined—
to address the powerful dynamics that have entrenched the acceptance of 
agricultural pollution. Section 208 of the CWA requires states to adopt plans 
that would control pollution from nonpoint sources, including agriculture, 
but has no effective means for requiring states to do so.291 Thus, “[l]eft to 
their own discretion and faced with significant opposition by agricultural, 
mining, and construction lobbies, most states have chosen not to adopt 
meaningful management plans under section 208.”292 
	
 289  See United States v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979) (oil spill into 
tributary that did not have running water at the time of spill involved a discharge to “waters of 
the United States”). 
 290  Id. at 178. Many states, such as Ohio and Texas, have challenged the new rule 
ideologically as an invasion of traditionally state (and locally) regulated land activities. 
Cameron Langford, 18 States Challenge Clean Water Rule, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV., June 30, 
2015, http://www.courthousenews.com/2015/06/30/18-states-challenge-clean-water-rule.htm (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2016). Federalism in its many forms has animated environmental regulation 
conflicts. Merrill, supra note 55, at 283–84. The CWA is perceived as a cooperative federalism 
framework, and to look at history it seems that approach is aptly descriptive. Id.; Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (acknowledging “[t]he Clean Water Act anticipates a 
partnership between the States and the Federal Government”). For example, once SWANCC 
delivered a defeat to Corps regulation of remote wetlands some states scrutinized their efforts 
to help fill in the gap. Merrill, supra note 55, at 309. 
 291  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2012) (requiring Governors to identify areas with water quality 
control issues and develop management plans); see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. 
THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 162 (3d ed. 2010). 
 292  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 291, at 162. 
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Related to arguments over states’ rights is the admonition to respect 
private property. Critics of the rule emphasize that the federal government is 
attempting to regulate land use through a more expansive definition of 
“waters.”293 This argument is so paper-thin it is somewhat remarkable it has 
so much support. The CWA, as with most other environmental law, regulates 
human activities. Yes, the CWA does not just regulate activities occurring on 
waters, but necessarily activities out of water—where people manufacture 
goods, generate power, and farm294—which when left unregulated allowed 
our waters to become a garbage receptacle. It is in all ways a pollution 
control statute. If property law were to become more internally reflective of 
an ecological ethic, the CWA would not have to be the impediment to certain 
ill-sited, unsustainable development, as it is currently vilified. 
The power of the agricultural industry also creates a hurdle. As this 
Article has highlighted, the Act and the regulations create exemptions for 
agricultural activities that would otherwise require a permit to persist after 
the Clean Water Rule’s adoption.295 As Professors Salzman and Thompson 
note, “[t]he agricultural lobby, in particular, has been very successful in 
weakening or killing off proposals to regulate nonpoint pollution more 
rigorously.”296 This means continued and effective point source regulation 
under the CWA is necessary to maintain if not actually improve water quality 
in the United States, be it from nonexempted agricultural activities or 
otherwise. 
But these other explanations fall short. As a general rule, the agencies 
do not simply leave the regulation of nonpoint source pollutants entirely to 
the states, instead requiring efforts to address polluted waters, even if those 
waters are only polluted by nonpoint sources. The agencies have taken 
politically uncomfortable positions in other cases, regulating agriculture 
under the Act. What, then, drives the exclusions? Significant evidence 
suggests, that the primary motivation for resistance to the regulation of 
ditches by EPA and the Corps is their unwillingness to recognize our 
increasingly formative role in our interconnected world.  
The best evidence for this view comes from the other exclusions, 
beyond just ditches, in the new rule: 
  Groundwater and erosional features;297  
  “Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should 
application of irrigation water to that area cease;”298  
	
 293  See, e.g., Ben Wolfgang & Steven Dinan, EPA Expands Powers Over Land Use in Bid to 
Control Water Pollution, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2015/may/27/epa-expands-powers-over-land-use-bid-control-water/?page=all (last visited Apr. 9, 
2016). 
 294  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 291, at 147. 
 295  See supra note 170 and accompanying text.  
 296  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 291, at 163. 
 297  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,107 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 298  Id. at 37,105. 
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  “Artificial, constructed lakes or ponds created by excavating 
and/or diking dry land such as farm and stock watering ponds, 
irrigation ponds, settling basins, log cleaning ponds, cooling ponds, 
or fields flooded for rice growing;”299  
  “Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created by 
excavating and/or diking dry land;”300  
  “Small ornamental waters created by excavating and/or diking dry 
land for primarily aesthetic reasons;”301  
  “Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to mining 
or construction activity, including pits excavated for obtaining fill, 
sand or gravel that fill with water”;302  
  “Erosional features, including gullies, rills, and other ephemeral 
features that do not meet the definition of tributary, non-wetland 
swales, and lawfully constructed grassed waterways;”303  
  “Puddles;”304 and  
  “Stormwater control features constructed to convey, treat, or store 
stormwater that are created in dry land.”305  
With the exception of groundwater, these new exclusions cover 
landscape features that, under the old regulations, “could be determined on 
a case-specific basis to be ‘waters of the United States,’”306 but which are now 
entirely off limits to the protections of the Act. Most of these exceptions—
seven of the nine, on our count—are manmade features, and it beggars belief 
to claim this is a coincidence. This certainly appears to be a capitulation by 
the agencies to the easy argument that manmade places often are not worth 
protecting 
Humankind has remade our environment through a series of changes, 
both monumental and small but creeping.307 Facing up to and managing these 
changes brings us to a central challenge of the Age of the Anthropocene: 
how we should deal with an environment that we have fundamentally 
changed and which, in most cases, we are unable or unwilling to restore to a 
	
 299  Id. at 37,107. 
 300  Id. 
 301  Id. at 37,098. 
 302  Id. at 37,107. 
 303  Id. 
 304  Id. 
 305  Id. 
 306  Id. at 37,098. 
  307  See, e.g., Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 141, 189–90 (2012) (examining regulatory protection of critical habitat and the 
potential for incremental degradation). Professor Owen explains this as the challenge of line-
drawing between large and small harms, which is inherent in environmental law because harm 
lies along a continuum: “The distinction is even harder to draw if, as is often the case, no one 
knows how much harm each action will cause.” Id. at 189. This is certainly the case with the 
lowly ditch, and its thus far understudied and undervalued impacts on water quality. 
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pristine state. The burgeoning field of reconciliation ecology addresses this 
question. We define reconciliation ecology as the “science of inventing, 
establishing, and maintaining new habitats to conserve species diversity in 
places where people live, work, and play.”308 This is not a “giving up” on 
protection of our wilderness, our national parks, or our untrammeled 
places—we must continue to protect these places as pristine environments, 
largely devoid of human impacts. But in many areas, we must recognize that 
although much historic habitat has been irreversibly altered, the habitats we 
have created have value, and we should act to protect those places. 
No where is this clearer than in the regulation of our water resources. 
Clean water is central to our survival,309 to the protection of the natural 
environment, and in short, to the maintenance of every other natural 
resource. But “[s]treams and rivers are among the most highly altered 
ecosystems worldwide,”310 and these alterations are largely permanent. 
California, the state known as the country’s breadbasket (at least before the 
ongoing drought), has lost approximately 94% of its historic wetlands, some 
to urban development and some to agriculture.311 Similar transformation has 
occurred in the Everglades of Florida.312 While most policymakers believe 
some restoration of these seriously degraded environments would benefit 
society in the short- and long-term,313 the prospects of making heavily farmed 
areas a semblance of their former ecosystems is unlikely. We will never 
fallow our farmlands or take down all our dams. The California Delta will 
never return to its naturally functioning state.  
It is in these areas that many promote reconciliation ecology over other 
aggressive, but improbable, forms of restoring ecosystems to historic 
conditions.314 If we accept, then, that these places will not and cannot be 
	
 308  ROSENZWIEG, supra note 19, at 7.  
 309  The most powerful recognition of the centrality of water to mankind is the relatively 
recent acceptance by the U.N. General Assembly of an independent Human Right to Water. 
JOHN SCANLON ET AL., INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NAT. RES., WATER AS A 
HUMAN RIGHT? 3–4 (Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 51, 2004) (tracing development of 
a human right to water in international law and noting no explicit mention of “water” in right to 
life). The right requires adequate quality and quantity of water for domestic use. Id. at 4. The 
right to water is also implicitly required as necessary for the right to a standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being. Id. The General Comment adopted by the U.N. committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights asserts plainly that “the human right to water is 
indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is prerequisite for the realization of other 
human rights.” U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 15, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).  
 310  Peter B. Moyle, Novel Aquatic Ecosystems: The New Reality for Streams in California 
and Other Mediterranean Climate Regions, 30 RIVER RES. APPLICATIONS 1335, 1335 (2013). 
 311  David Gilmer et al., California’s Central Valley Wintering Waterfowl: Concerns and 
Challenges, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 441, 444 (1982) (describing native wetlands in the Central Valley in 
particular as “small islands in a sea of agricultural and urban development”). 
 312  SOC’Y FOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INT’L, LARGE-SCALE ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION: FIVE 
CASE STUDIES FROM THE UNITED STATES 8–10 (Mary Doyle & Cynthia A. Drew eds., 2008).  
 313  Id. at iv.  
 314  Id. at 47. 
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restored to some kind of historical condition,315 where does that leave us? 
Reconciliation ecology suggests we “acknowledge[] that humans 
increasingly dominate most ecosystems on the planet, which leaves us with 
the responsibility to determine what we want these integrated ecosystems to 
look like and what species we want them to contain.”316 These ecosystems 
“require considerable human intervention if they are to support desirable, 
usually native, species.”317 These ecological principles provide some 
guidance—we should recognize that our actions have unalterably changed 
many aquatic habitats; some of these changed habitats have ecological 
value, and these valuable, new habitats must be protected and managed if 
they are to function as a constructive part of our ecosystem. The same 
principles extend to the structure and function of our watershed—our 
actions have unalterably changed the way that water moves through our 
watersheds;318 some of the changes we have made create landscape features 
that now serve a beneficial role in the altered watershed;319 and beneficial 
landscape features must be protected and managed if they are to function as 
a part of our watersheds.  
If we are to protect and manage these places, the CWA must be the 
vehicle. The CWA is the primary act protecting water quality in situ in the 
United States, and it plays a central role in controlling the feckless filling in 
of wetlands, streams, lakes, and rivers that had, prior to passage of the Act, 
characterized agriculture’s relationship with wet places.320 This, then, is the 
central question for the management of manmade beneficial landscape 
features: Does the Act provide them the same treatment accorded to natural 
beneficial landscape features? When it does, those places are protected and 
can continue to serve a beneficial role in the function of our ecosystems and 
our watersheds, and a thoughtful rule defining the Act’s jurisdiction should 
move us in that direction. But when it does not, as seen here where the 
	
 315  Even if we attempted this, determining which historical condition to aim for would be 
difficult. Since the earliest stages of agriculture, mankind has battled to tame the natural world 
for our benefit. Early efforts by white settlers in the United States were really just a second or 
third wave of farmers, following the earlier Native Americans that were here and changing 
landscapes before us. WILLIAM CRONAN, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE 
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 11–12 (1983). The scale and degree of change has been orders of 
magnitude greater, see id., but overlooking this history encourages us to think of our actions as 
something outside of the natural system, when they are not. 
 316  Moyle, supra note 310, at 1337. 
 317  Id. 
 318  As discussed above, these changes result in increased connectivity; higher, faster flows; 
decreased residence time; and degraded functions in terms of pollutant removal and water 
filtering. See discussion supra Part II.C.1–2. See also Rosenzwieg, supra note 19 at 7. See e.g., 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (noting that the goal of the CWA is to both “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”) (emphasis 
added).  
 319  See also Rosenzwieg, supra note 19 at 7. See e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (noting 
that the goal of the CWA is to both “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”). 
 320  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 291, at 178–79.  
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regulations largely exclude manmade ditches from protection, we sacrifice 
the benefits they provide. 
In the Age of the Anthropocene, we cannot exclude manmade 
environmental features simply because they are manmade. This is the future 
we have created, and the only one we can even hope to control. 
Reconciliation requires us to account for all these inputs; it would be 
antithetical to deregulate manmade environmental features and doing so is a 
major hamstring on our ability to preserve functioning ecosystems. The rule 
defining CWA juridiction should be changed to evaluate ditches and other 
mandmade features on a case by case basis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though the Clean Water Rule makes certain ditches jurisdictional, the 
approach of excluding some ditches and including others will likely require 
future litigation to help define the precise scope of inclusion over these 
important, although manmade features. On a scientific basis alone, the 
accumulation of many small contributions from ditches supports a broader 
inclusion to limit impairment of water quality. The public campaign against 
the Rule reflects a strategy of obscuring the known impacts of discharges 
from natural and manmade tributaries to downstream waters. It is time to 
come into our maturity, ditch the charades, and take up responsibilities 
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Table 1: Jurisdictional “Waters of the United States” 




(a)(1) All waters currently used, used in the past, 
or susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including waters subject to the 
ebb and flow of the tide. Exclusions under 
(b) do not reach (a)(1). 
Interstate 
Waters 
(a)(2) All interstate waters, including wetlands. 
Exclusions under (b) do not reach (a)(2). 
Territorial 
Seas 
(a)(3) The territorial seas. Exclusions under (b) do 
not reach (a)(3). 
Impound-
ments 
(a)(4) Impoundments of all waters identified as 
jurisdictional. 
Tributaries (a)(5) All tributaries, (defined in (c)(3)) of waters 
identified in (a)(1)–(3).  
Adjacent 
Waters 
(a)(6) All waters adjacent to waters identified in 
(a)(1) through (5), including wetlands, 
ponds, lakes, oxbows, impoundments, etc. 
(c)(1) defines “adjacent.” Excludes waters 






(a)(7) Prairie potholes, Carolina/Delmarva bays, 
Pocosins, Western vernal pools, and Texas 
coastal prairie wetlands where determined, 
on a case-specific basis, to have a significant 
nexus to a water identified in paragraphs 
(a)(1)–(3).323 If these waters fall under 











 321  References for sections relating to Definition of Waters of the United States are taken 
from 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2015). 
 322  See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (exempting from regulation discharges of 
dredged or fill material from normal farming, ranching, and silviculture activities). 
 323  These waters are similarly situated and shall be combined, for purposes of a significant 
nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to the nearest water identified in paragraphs 
(a)(1)–(3) of this section. 
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Table 1: Jurisdictional “Waters of the United States” (continued) 
Feature Section Explanation 
Significant Nexus 
Waters—Waters 
located in 100-year 
floodplain of 
(a)(1)–(a)(3) or 
within 4,000 feet of 
a high tide line 
(HTL) or ordinary 
high water mark 
(OHWM) of 
(a)(1)–(a)(5)  
(a)(8) All waters within the 100-year 
floodplain of waters in (a)(1)–(3) and 
all waters located within 4,000 feet of 
the HTL or OHWM of waters in  
(a)(1)–(5) where determined, on a 
case-specific basis, to have a 
significant nexus to waters in  
(a)(1)–(3).324 For waters determined to 
have a significant nexus, the entire 
water is a water of the United States if 
any portion is within the 100-year 
floodplain of waters in (a)(1)–(3) or 
within 4,000 feet of the HTL or OHWM 



























 324  Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in 
paragraph (a)(6) when performing a significant nexus analysis. 
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(b)(3)(i) Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a 
relocated tributary or excavated in a tributary. 
Ephemeral waters “have flowing water only in 
response to precipitation events in a typical 
year, and are always above the water table.”327 
A ditch relocates a stream if at least a portion 
of the stream’s original channel has been 
physically moved or the majority of its flow 




(b)(3)(ii) Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a 
relocated tributary, not excavated in a 
tributary, and not draining wetlands. 
Intermittent waters “have both precipitation 
and groundwater providing part of the 
stream’s flow, and flow continuously only 
during certain times of the year (e.g., during 




(b)(3)(iii) Ditches that do not flow, either directly or 
indirectly, into waters in (a)(1)–(3). 
	
	
 325  Many activities or discharges are also excluded from permit requirements, including: 
irrigation return flows, 33 U.S.C. § 402(l)(1) (2012); normal farming and minor drainage, id. 
§ 404(f)(1)(A), construction or maintenance of farm ponds, id. § 404(f)(1)(C); construction or 
maintenance of irrigation ditches, id.; maintenance of drainage ditches, id.; construction or 
maintenance of farm roads, id. § 404(f)(1); and agricultural stormwater discharges, id. § 502(14). 
As of 2012, several activities related to ditches are authorized pursuant to a nationwide permit. 
These activities include ditch maintenance, agricultural activities, and reshaping existing 
drainage ditches. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 2012 NATIONWIDE PERMITS, CONDITIONS, 
DISTRICT ENGINEER’S DECISION, FURTHER INFORMATION, AND DEFINITIONS, available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP2012_corrections_21-sep-
2012.pdf. 
 326  References for sections relating to definition of “waters of the United States” are taken 
from 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2015). 
 327  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,076 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 328  Id. 
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Includes waste treatment systems (recycling 
structures, percolation basins, etc.); irrigated 
areas that would be dry absent irrigation; 
constructed lakes/ponds, reflecting pools, or 
swimming pools created on dry land; irrigation 
ponds; settling basins; log cleaning ponds; 
cooling ponds; flooded rice fields; small 
ornamental waters created on dry land for 
aesthetic reasons; water-filled depressions in 
dry land from mining or construction (includes 
gravel pits); erosional features that do not 
meet the definition of tributary; lawfully 
constructed grassed waterways; and 
stormwater control features constructed to 
convey, treat, or store stormwater on dry land. 
Ground-
water 






(b)(2) Based on EPA determination.
 
